

JERUSALEM ON THE MAP



The International Peace and Cooperation Center
Jerusalem

Jerusalem on the Map III

Research Team

***Rassem Khamaisi
Robert Brooks
Mona Al Qutob***

***Rami Nasrallah
Shahd Wa'ary***

***Michael Younan
Abdalla Owais***

International Peace and Cooperation Center: Publication XV

Jerusalem Strategic Planning Series Editor: Dr. Robert Brooks

Preparation for the Print: Shahd Wa'ary

Photos: Shahd Wa'ary

Cover Map: Mona Al Qutob

Layout and Cover Design: Alternative Business Solutions - www.abs.ps

Printed and Bound in Ramallah by: Alternative Business Solutions - www.abs.ps

© 2007

ISBN 965-7283-12-4

The International Peace and Cooperation Center

21 Sheikh Jarrah, Ard Assamar, Isawiyya Road, Jerusalem

P.O. Box: 24162

E-mail address: info@ipcc-jerusalem.org

Website: www.ipcc-jerusalem.org

Tel: + 972 (0) 2 5811992 or + 972 (0)2 5812032

Fax: + 972 (0) 2 5400522

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	7
Preface	9
Development of Boundaries and Spatial Relations	11
The Old City of Jerusalem	14
Jerusalem Population	18
Population 1526 - 1961	18
Population 1967 - 2004	19
Population Growth	20
Muslim and Christian Trends	22
Population by Age and Gender	23
Population Distribution	23
Services	28
Education	28
Health	29
The Jerusalem Economy	30
National Accounts	30
Sources of Personal Income	31
Employment	31
Tourism	33
Governorate Enterprises	34
Trade	34
Housing	35
Available Land and Housing Density	35
The Threat of Green	38
Building Expansion	40
Municipal Taxes	42
Residency and the "Center of Life" Policy	43
ID Revocation	44
The New Israeli Jerusalem Master Plan	45
Israeli Settlements	48
East Jerusalem Settlements	48
Greater Jerusalem Settlements	49
The E-1 Expansion Plan	55
Roads	57
Regional Roads	57
Municipal Linking Roads	59

Neighborhood Connectors 60

Checkpoints 64

Permanent Checkpoints 65

Non-permanent Checkpoints 67

Road Blockades 71

The Wall of Fragmentation 73

Segments of the Fragmentation Wall in and around Jerusalem 73

The Effect of the Wall on East Jerusalem 75

Bibliography 80

List of Maps

Map 1:	Changes in Municipal Boundaries in Jerusalem since 1863	13
Map 2:	The Old City of Jerusalem: The Population in the Different Quarters in 2003 and 2005	16
Map 3:	East Jerusalem Population Distribution in 2003 and 2005	27
Map 4:	Planned Master Plan of Jerusalem 2020	47
Map 5:	Palestinian Enclaves and Israeli Settlements in Jerusalem	51
Map 6:	Israeli Settlements: Built-up, Jurisdiction, New Settlements and Expansion Plans	52
Map 7:	Map of the Settlement Plan E-1	56
Map 8:	Roads in the Jerusalem Area	63
Map 9:	The Jerusalem Area Checkpoints, Blockades and Barriers	72
Map 10:	The Trajectory of the Israeli Wall of Annexation and Expansion in the Jerusalem Area	77
Map 11:	De facto Annexed Greater Jerusalem in Coordination with the Wall Trajectory and Settlement Blocs	78

List of Figures

Figure 1.	The Historical (Holy) Basin of Jerusalem: Open Areas and Urban Environment Scheme in Master Plan 2020	17
Figure 2.	Rate of Annual Growth of Population for Palestinians and Israelis in Jerusalem: 1990 - 2005	21
Figure 3.	The increase in the number of Buildings and Households in East Jerusalem Neighborhoods between 1990 and 2004	24
Figure 4.	Number of Palestinian Housing Units in East Jerusalem in 2002 and 2004	25
Figure 5.	Number of Palestinian Electricity Subscribers in East Jerusalem by Neighborhood in 1998, 2000 and 2002	25
Figure 6.	Number of Palestinian Electricity Subscribers in the Jerusalem Governorate by Neighborhood in 1998, 2000 and 2002	26
Figure 7:	Decrease in Land areas allocated for Palestinian Development in East Jerusalem 1967 - 2006	36
Figure 8:	Green Area and "Illegal Houses" in Beit Hanina	39
Figure 9:	Green Area and "Illegal Houses" in Sur Bahir	40
Figure 10.	Number of Palestinians who lost ID cards and residency rights for selected years 1967 – 2004	44

List of Tables

Table 1.	Development of the Political and Administrative Boundaries of Municipal Jerusalem 1850 - 2005	12
Table 2.	Population Development in Jerusalem in Selected Years: 1831 - 1961	18
Table 3.	Population of Jerusalem by Ethno-National Affiliation, Selected Years 1967 - 2005	19
Table 4.	Population Growth in Jerusalem in Selected Years: 1982 - 2005	20
Table 5.	Palestinian Population Distribution by East Jerusalem Neighborhood 2003, 2004 and 2005	23
Table 6.	PA Governmental, UNRWA and Private Schools, Pupils and Classes by Scholastic Year	28
Table 7.	Municipal Education Schools, Pupils and Classes by Scholastic Year	29
Table 8.	National Accounts: Annual GDP-pc, GNDI-pc and GNI-pc (2002)	31
Table 9.	Sources of Personal Income (%): April-June 2005	31
Table 10.	Overview of Governorate Employment and Distribution of Work Force by Sectors (%) 2005	32
Table 11.	Selected Governorate Employment, Unemployment, Earnings, Spending, and Poverty Levels	32
Table 12.	Unemployment in the Jerusalem Governorate: 2002 - 2005	33
Table 13.	Governorate Hotel Activity: 2000, 2004, and 2005	33
Table 14.	Number of Governorate Enterprises Operating in the Private Sector (including Government Owned Businesses), 2004 - 2005	34
Table 15.	Fees and Levies for Obtaining a Building Permit for a 200 sq.m. House on Half a Dunum	37
Table 16.	Required Housing Units and Building Area by 2020	41
Table 17.	Possible Housing Units in Approved and Un-approved Plans for Palestinian Neighborhoods and Expectations by Year 2020	41
Table 18.	Arnona Tax Rates in East Jerusalem, 2003	42
Table 19.	Israeli Settlements in East Jerusalem by Year of Establishment, Area and Population: 2000, 2003 and 2005	48
Table 20.	Israeli Settlements in Greater Jerusalem, Year of Establishment, Area and Population in selected years: 2000 – 2006	50
Table 21.	The Relationship between Road Routes and Communities	61
Table 22.	Permanent Israeli Occupation Force Checkpoints in and around Jerusalem	65
Table 23.	Categorizing of Daily Commuters to and from Jerusalem according to Checkpoint , 2007	67
Table 24.	Israeli Occupation Force Frequent Checkpoints within the Old City and the Inner Belt	68
Table 25.	Israeli Occupation Force Frequent Checkpoints within the Palestinian Neighborhoods of Jerusalem	68
Table 26.	Israeli Occupation Force Frequent Checkpoints outside the Municipal Boundary of Jerusalem and its Suburbs	69

Acknowledgements

The International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC) acknowledges, with genuine gratitude, the cooperation we received from Palestinian community leaders. Their assistance in facilitating the collection of data in Palestinian neighborhoods was invaluable. We also thank the students and researchers who carried out our field work and surveys.

Jerusalem on the Map III is the tenth volume in IPCC's Jerusalem Strategic Planning Series, a series of research publications generously supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES). The foundation's support allows IPCC to disseminate its work to a much wider audience than would be otherwise possible.

Sincere thanks and gratitude are especially addressed to FES Resident Representative Mr. Knut Dethlefsen for his continuing support.

Preface

Beginning with the annexation of Palestinian neighborhoods in 1968, the past four decades of Israeli occupation have brought a multitude of spatial, political, economic, and social changes to the Jerusalem area. Moreover, in a process that began with closure policies in 1993 which prevent suburban, West Bank, and Gaza Palestinians from entering and working in East Jerusalem, followed and sustained by an ensnaring grid of settlers-only roads, checkpoints, and road blocks, and most recently by the imposition of a mammoth separation wall, there has been a profound alteration in the demography and functionality of Jerusalem. The changes have culminated in an East Jerusalem that is in real danger of losing its status as the metropolitan center for the Palestinian people. Indeed, a city that was for centuries the cultural, institutional, economic, political, health, education, religious, and even entertainment center of an entire people has gradually become a peripheral and fragmented urban area, cut off from its nurturing suburban surroundings and isolated from its historical hinterlands. More, it has been so internally shredded, with many Palestinian neighborhoods cut off from each other and from their urban core, that it may lack the functional cohesiveness and integrity to serve as the future capital of a Palestinian state.

Jerusalem on the Map III represents IPCC's continuing effort to update the situation on the ground in Jerusalem for a readership composed of international civil servants, academics interested in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, and governmental, NGO, and civil society leaders interested in the problems of Jerusalem. In this volume, IPCC researchers identify and examine trends in Israel's hegemony over the Jerusalem area today. The studies document—with the most current statistics, the results of IPCC surveys, and the presentation of new detailed maps—the unilateral expansion of Israel's illegal writ and the fragmentation of the Palestinian fabric in Jerusalem. Issues considered include: the emergence of new, non-negotiated boundaries; the widespread and systematic deprivation of basic human rights; externally imposed changes in the city's demography; declines in nearly all measures of the economic and social well-being of Palestinian Jerusalemites; a swelling unmet need for housing; the effects of the road system, checkpoints, road blocks and the separation wall upon mobility and social cohesiveness and upon the people's right to the city. Again, overarching the analytical discussion is the question of East Jerusalem's viability to function as the capital of a proud people.

Development of Boundaries and Spatial Relations

Jerusalem Area and Boundaries

The borders of Jerusalem have been modified and expanded on more than ten occasions in the past six decades, and even now there are additional Israeli plans for further expansion, most conspicuously those associated with the route of the separation wall, including the massive E-1 plan that will bring within the city borders thousands of dunums* from outlying lands. Each change has been predicated on two Israeli goals: demographic superiority and the expansion of sovereignty. Regarding the former, Israel has sought to maintain its demographic population advantage by manipulating the borders in such a manner as to exclude from the city built-up Palestinian areas with dense populations (such as Ar Ram) and in-filling with Israeli settlers any vacant lands within the city. The other consideration is the simple phenomenon of increasing territorial holdings as a means of expanding sovereignty. It is obvious, then, why new definitions of administrative and political borders invariably have produced tensions and have offended the ethnic sensitivities and national aspirations of Palestinian Jerusalemites.

In the past, the most common perception of Jerusalem was the historical area within the Old City walls. Others add to the "definition" the hilly basin around Jerusalem, composed of a memorable visual tableau overlooking the city. This addition to the definition has had an influence on geopolitical proposals and on political and administrative arrangements, including the demarcation of the Jerusalem borders. Expanding the borders of Jerusalem has always been proposed as a means to annex vast nearby areas under the definition of Metropolitan Jerusalem.

Other proposals have been designed to shrink

the city boundaries to include only the Old City and its immediate surroundings. Between these two perhaps extreme positions are other intermediate proposals, the consequences of which must be measured against their ability to maintain both the uniqueness of the city and the salient interests of the Palestinians.

The following table includes a summary of the modifications and expansions in municipal borders that took place between 1948 and 2005. The table data demonstrate that there has been a multiplication by a factor of seven in the original area of 1948. The magnitude of this relatively recent increase can best be appreciated when it is recalled that until the end of the Ottoman era, Jerusalem was defined as the Old City and the walls presented its physical borders, and it was not until the British mandate that the borders were modified to include the built up areas outside the walls. However, the most considerable change in the borders has been through the Israeli occupation of the city which began in 1967.

The expression of "East Jerusalem" was created after Jerusalem was divided in 1948 and included 6,000 dunums which were annexed to the area of municipal Jerusalem after Israeli occupation. However, after 1967, this expression denoted a total area of 70,000 dunums belonging to 28 surrounding villages and towns, most of which were annexed to municipal Jerusalem boundaries after the 1967 occupation.

Changing the boundaries of Jerusalem had a direct effect on modifying bases of sovereignty and local administration, the nature of community and ethnic structures, the political reality and the citizens' sense and right of belonging.

* One dunum is 1/4th of an acre.

Table 1. Development of the Political and Administrative Boundaries of Municipal Jerusalem 1850 – 2005 (see Map 1)

Year		Area (in dunums)	Notes
1850		870	Inside Old City walls
1918		3500	According to McLean's Master Plan
1948		20,430	Before division of the city
1949		16,450 (80.5%)	After division, West Jerusalem under Israeli control
		3,117 (15.3%)	East Jerusalem under Jordanian control
		856 (4.2%)	Included within East Jerusalem, but under supervision of United Nations or in buffer zones. Area composed of: 449 dunums for public lands, 204 dunums for Christian and European institutions, 166 dunums for Jews, and 37 dunums for Palestinians.
1952	East Jerusalem	6,000	Expanding East Jerusalem from 3,117 to 6,000 dunums. Joining the planning jurisdiction borders with the municipality borders.
	West Jerusalem	33,500	Expanding West Jerusalem from 16,450 to 33,500 dunums. Unifying the planning jurisdiction borders with the municipality borders.

The area of the Palestinian Jerusalem Governorate including East Jerusalem is 333,000 dunums according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.

The Area of the Israeli Jerusalem District, including municipal East and West Jerusalem, is 652,000 dunums.

The UN partition plan (resolution number 181 issued on the 29th of November, 1947) considered Jerusalem as a Corpus Separatum and proposed expanding its boundaries to include 258,000 dunums. This includes municipal Jerusalem and 20 surrounding villages and cities such as Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Beit Sahour.

The Old City of Jerusalem



The area of the Old City of Jerusalem and its surrounding basin constitute the core of the city. Most of the attempts to reach geopolitical solutions or agreements between the Palestinians and the Israelis over Jerusalem, encounter a difficulty in finding proposals that will be agreeable to both sides. The conflict over controlling, developing and planning the Old City is ongoing.

The area of the Old City within the wall is about 871 dunums. Under the Ottoman reign of Suleiman, 1520-1566, there was considerable development; the ancient walls were rebuilt and the Old City enjoyed an era of prosperity. Most of the holy places for the three religions lie within the Old City and many of the architectural, cultural and archaeological sites that have a historical, religious and sentimental value are concentrated there. The Old City is the functional and symbolical center of the Jerusalem. It may be viewed as a virtual museum; it is a key part of an area which was

declared a world heritage in 1983, protected by UNESCO.

Complications and difficulties in defining landownership in the Old City have caused conflicts between residents of the community. The problems arise mainly because in the past the authorities did not carry through a formal and final parcelation that would have produced land titles. The land is used by various families of diverse ethnicity in a multitude of enterprises. Some of the land is rented from the family Waqfs or the General Waqf. The available data indicate that 24% of the Old City is owned by the Waqfs; 29% owned by Christian institutions; 28% owned by Palestinian Arabs; the remaining 19% is owned by the Israeli government, based on confiscation and expropriation from the Waqfs and Palestinian Arabs.

Until the 1967 Israeli annexation, all the area of the Old City was in the Jordanian East

Jerusalem municipality, without any Israelis residing in it. In 1967, approximately 23,700 persons resided in the Old City: 16,700 Muslims (70%) and 7,000 Christians (approximately 30%). At the end of 2004, 35,900 resided there, divided between 26,300 Muslims (73%), 6,500 Christians (18%), and approximately 3,100 Jews (approximately 9%). The net area used for housing in the Old City is approximately 350 dunums. The average density is approximately 103 persons per dunum. This is one of the highest densities in the world.

According to the available data, there were 5,793 dwellings in the Old City at the end of 2004; total land area devoted to housing is 261,135 sq.m. The average area per dwelling is approximately 45 sq.m., yielding approximately 7.4 square meters of housing per person. Within the Old City there is variation in the housing conditions. The Muslim Quarter suffers from the worst housing conditions. There, the average area per dwelling is 40.6 sq.m. and the housing square meter per person is approximately 5.5 meters.

In spite of the bad and deteriorating conditions in the Old City, the annual population growth in 2004 was approximately two percent. Within the Muslim Quarter, the annual growth rate averages five percent. Since Israel imposed a closure over Jerusalem, and particularly since the building of the separation wall around Jerusalem began, there has been a trend of Palestinian families to move back to the Old City, where the cost of living and housing are low. The medium age within the Old City is approximately 17 years.

In addition to being the religious core of a culture, the Old City is an internal and foreign tourist center which attracts visitors and pilgrims. This centrality has led to an economy

that includes about 2000 commercial enterprises servicing tourists and selling traditional handcraft and souvenirs.

Since 2000 the Israeli government policy has been to strengthen its control over the Old City of Jerusalem, especially the holy places. More than 500 closed circuit security cameras have been placed throughout the Old City, and the military presence and settlers activities have been intensified recently there and on Mount of Olives and Silwan.

Since the time of the British Mandate, the Old City has formed the departure point for most master and outline plans for development in Jerusalem. Indeed, the most recent outline plan for Jerusalem, < Jerusalem 2000 >, which was initiated by the Israeli government, has used the Old City as the core of the plan, and allocated from there the zoning of the city, and the transportation network for the area, connecting the Old City to the other parts of the urban fabric of East and West Jerusalem and the surrounding areas.

Security and control over the Holy Basin has also been intensified. This area, which is also known as the Historical Basin, is a geographical construct first employed by a research team of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies who have been working on the final status of Jerusalem since 1996. The geographic definition of the area includes the Old City walls, the Qidron valley, the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives, the Gethsemane Gardens and Church, the Russian Church and the Mount of Zion. The total area of the Holy Basin is 2,210 dunums. Other definitions of the area include the Christian institutions just to the north of the Damascus Gate (57 dunums), the ancient City of David in Silwan (194 dunums) and the Mount of Offence in Ras Al Amud (41 dunums).

Map 2. The Old City of Jerusalem: The Population in the Different Quarters in 2003 and 2005





Figure 1. The Historical Basin of Jerusalem: Open Areas and Urban Environment Scheme on Master Plan 2020



Source: Holy/Historical Basin boundary is according to the JIIS definition, and the landuse of the basin is according to the Master Plan of Jerusalem 2020.

Jerusalem Population

Population 1526 - 1961

According to Ottoman statistics, the population in Jerusalem in the year 1526 was 2,807. This number rose to 8,471 in 1597. In the year 1831, 11,000 people resided in Jerusalem, 27.3 percent of whom were Jewish. In 1831, the Palestinians constituted nearly three-fourths of the population; by 1920, there was essentially a 50/50 parity between the Palestinian and Jewish residents. At the end of 1947, the number of residents in Jerusalem reached 164,500, 60.4 percent of whom were Jewish.

Table 2 shows the population development in Jerusalem for selected years between 1831 and 1961, according to ethno-national affiliation. From the table data, we see that the percentage of Palestinians in Jerusalem has declined while that of the Jewish residents has increased. By 1947, before the Nakba*, the Jewish population had increased to 60.4 percent and the Jews outnumbered the Arabs by a 3:2 ratio.

Table 2. Population Development in Jerusalem in Selected Years: 1831 – 1961

Ethno-national Affiliation	Years									
	1831		1920		1931		1947 ⁽¹⁾		1961 ⁽²⁾	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Palestinians	8,000	72.2	31,000	50.8	39,229	43.4	65,100	39.6	60,488	26.7
Jews	3,000	27.3	30,000	49.2	51,000	56.6	99,400	60.4	166,300	73.3
Total	11,000	100	61,000	100	90,451	100	164,500	100	226,788	100

Source: Al-Audat, Hussein, ed. (1990). *The Encyclopedia of Palestinian Cities*. Damascus: Department of Culture, PLO, p.618.

⁽¹⁾ The number of residents before the division of Jerusalem into an eastern part with Palestinian residents, and a western part with Jewish residents.

⁽²⁾ In 1948, the city was divided into East and West Jerusalem. In preparing this table, we combined the population data for the two areas into one figure; the percentage given for each area is based on that combined figure.

The Jewish increase continued to such an extent that by 1961 a reversal had occurred in the 1831 data: Jews had come to represent nearly three-fourths of the population of Jerusalem. The main reason for the increase in the number of Jewish residents during the nineteenth century was the immigration of Jews to the city for religious reasons. During the twentieth century, the growth in Jewish population can be attributed to national identity factors and political, economic and ideological motives. The increase in Palestinian population can be attributed

primarily to natural growth (i.e. births minus deaths). It should also be noted that most of the Palestinian villages of Jerusalem were not included in the British Mandate municipal boundaries, while all Jewish neighborhoods in the west were (see **Map 1**). The exclusion of the Palestinian villages is significant: before 1948, 66 Palestinian villages surrounded the city, and more than 85,000 Palestinians lived within them. Thus a more accurate estimate of the population pegs the Palestinian representation in the area of Jerusalem to have been approximately 60 percent.

* The Nakba, or Catastrophe, refers to the War of 1947 in which 700,000 Palestinians were removed from their lands and over 400 villages were destroyed by Israeli forces.

Population 1967 - 2005

After the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in June 1967, Israel immediately annexed the eastern part of the city. The Israeli Ministry of Interior issued a special decree dissolving the Jordanian Municipality Council and extending the jurisdiction of the Israeli municipality over the entire annexed area. On June 28, 1967, the Israeli Knesset passed a law formally extending Israeli laws, jurisdiction, and civil administration over Arab East Jerusalem, and in 1980 the sense of this law was made part of the Israeli Basic Law, which serves in lieu of a constitution. Following the 1967 occupation of East Jerusalem, Israel conducted a census which classified Palestinians within the newly created municipal boundary as "Permanent Residents of the State of Israel." Jerusalemites who were not recorded were classified as "absentees" and lost their right to live in the city.

The population within the Israeli Municipal Boundary of Jerusalem (East and West) after the June occupation was a total of 266,300: 68,600 Palestinians (25.8 percent) and 197,700 Israelis (74.2 percent). According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2003, the population of Jerusalem was 693,200: 464,500 Israelis (67 percent) and 228,700 Palestinians (33 percent). The population of Jerusalem reached 719,900 at the end of 2005 (on 30.9.06 it was 729,100). The Palestinians numbered 244,800 constituting 34 percent of Jerusalem population; the Israelis numbered 475,100 constituting 66.0 percent of the population.

In 2003, the population of the Jerusalem was 693,200: 464,500 Israelis (67 percent) and 228,700 Palestinians (33 percent). Between 1967 and 2005, the number of residents in Jerusalem rose by 170.3 percent. The Jewish population increased by 140.3 percent for the same period and that of the Palestinians rose by 256.8 percent.

Table 3 shows the 1967-2004 population of Jerusalem by ethno-national affiliation, based on the data from the Israeli Bureau of Statistics. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, however, estimated the Jerusalem Palestinian population in the end of 2003 to be 254,099, a number 26,099 higher than the Israeli statistic for the end of 2003. In addition, The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the Jerusalem Palestinian population in 2005 to be 251,300, a number higher than the Israeli statistics for mid 2005. The gap in the data may arise from a different conception of the Jerusalem boundaries and from the fact that the Israeli statistics do not take into account Jerusalemites who live in the city but do not hold an Israeli identity card. The number of Palestinians, who live in the areas surrounding the Israeli Municipal Jerusalem but within the Jerusalem Governorate, as defined by the Palestinian National Authority, reached 149,150 in 2005. The biggest localities within this region are Ar Ram (24,780) Al Eizariya (17,142), Abu Dis (11,932), Kafr Aqab (10,257) and Anata (9,315) (see **Map 10**). These data do not include residents who hold the East Jerusalem ID card; when they are considered, the population in Ar Ram, for example, is estimated at 55,000.

Table 3. Population of Jerusalem by Ethno-National Affiliation, Selected Years 1967 – 2005

Year	Number of Residents (thousands)					
	Palestinians		Israelis		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1967	68.6	25.8	197.7	74.2	266.3	100
1972	83.5	26.6	230.3	73.4	313.8	100
1983	122.4	28.6	306.3	71.4	428.7	100
1987	136.5	28.3	346.1	71.7	482.6	100
1995	181.8	30.2	420.9	69.8	602.7	100
1999	201.3	31.1	444.9	68.8	646.3	100

2000	208.7	31.7	448.8	68.3	657.5	100
2001	215.4	32.1	454.6	67.9	670.0	100
2002	221.9	32.6	458.6	67.4	680.4	100
2003	228.0	32.9	464.3	67.1	692.3	100
2004	237.1	33.6	469.3	66.4	706.4	100
2005	244.8	34.0	475.1	66.0	719.9	100

Source: *The Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook, No. 20, 2002-2003*, the Israeli Bureau of Statistics, and the JIIS *Jerusalem: Facts and Trends 2004*. Data of 2005 based on source: http://www1.cbs.gov.il/shnaton57/st02_14.pdf.

Population Growth

The data illustrated by **Table 4** and **Figure 2** below, indicate the annual growth rates of Palestinians and Israelis in selected years. **Table 4** shows that the Israeli rate of population growth dropped from 2.2 percent in 1982 to 1.2 percent in 2005. For the same period, the Palestinian rate of population growth rose from 2.4 in to 3.2 percent. **Figure 2** presents the combined effect of birth and migration rates between 1990 and 2005. The Palestinian total population

of Jerusalem increased from 25.8 percent in 1967, to 28.6 percent in 1983, then to 33 percent by the end of 2003, and rose again to reach 34 percent in the end of 2005. The Israeli total population dropped from 74.2 percent in 1967, to 71.4 percent in 1983, then to 67.0 percent by the end of 2003, and dropped a further 1 percent in the end of 2005. The Palestinians population growth is out come of high natural increases and positive immigration into the city.

Table 4. Population Growth in Jerusalem in Selected Years: 1982 – 2005

Years	Number of Residents (Thousands)			Rate of Population Growth (Percentage)		
	Palestinians	Israelis	Total	Palestinians	Israelis	Total
1982	120.2	304.2	424.4	2.4%	2.2%	2.3%
1992	155.5	401.0	556.5	2.8%	2.1%	2.3%
2002	222.1	459.2	681.3	3.1%	1.0%	1.7%
2003	228.0	464.3	692.3	2.6%	1.0%	1.5%
2004	237.1	469.3	706.4	3.7%	1.0%	1.9%
2005	244.8	475.1	719.9	3.2%	1.2%	1.9%


Source: *The Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook, No. 20, 2002-2003*, the Israeli Bureau of Statistics, and the JIIS *Jerusalem: Facts and Trends 2004*. Data of 2005 based on source: http://www1.cbs.gov.il/shnaton57/st02_14.pdf

Population Growth: Birthrates

In 1972 the birthrate among Palestinians in Jerusalem was 50.4 per thousand. It then dropped to 28.3 in 1987 but increased in 1995 to 38.1. In the years 2000 and 2001 the birthrate was 34, and declined again in 2003 to 32.5.

In 1973 the birthrate of the Jewish population in Jerusalem was 29 per thousand. It then decreased to 28.8 in 1988, to 26.3 in 1993 and then to 24.1 in 2001. In 2002, the birthrate among Jewish residents of Jerusalem edged

Figure 2. Rate of Annual Growth of Population for Palestinians and Israelis in Jerusalem: 1990 – 2005



Source: Based on *The Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook, No. 20, 2002-2003*, and the *JlIS Jerusalem: Facts and Trends 2004*.

up to 24.7 per thousand and in 2003, it reached 25.2 per thousand, compared to 21.7 in Israel.

In 2002, the average fertility rate (*number of children a woman is expected to bear during her lifetime*) for Palestinian Jerusalem women was 4.3. In 2003, was 4.2 compared to 5.6 in the West Bank and the Gaza strip.

In 2002, the average fertility rate was highest among Jewish Ultra-Orthodox women (*Haredi*), reaching 7.5 children; for all Jewish women it was 3.9. In 2003, the Ultra-Orthodox rate increased to 7.7, and it was 4.0 for all Jewish women.

In 2005, the birthrate among Jewish residents of Jerusalem reached 22.0 per thousand, compared to 15.8 in Israel. Among the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, the birthrate reached 27.8 for the same year. The annual growth of Jerusalem municipality population in 2005 was 1.9%, among Israelis in Jerusalem it was 1.2%, while among the Palestinian was 3.3%. In 2002, the birthrate among Jewish residents of Jerusalem, reached 24.7 per thousand.

In 2005, the average fertility rate was highest among Jewish Ultra-Orthodox women, reaching 7.2 children. The overall average among Jewish women was 3.8. The average

fertility rate for Palestinian Jerusalem women reached 4.1 compared to 5.2 in the West Bank and the Gaza strip.

Population Growth: Immigration

Despite the fact that 55,700 Russians have immigrated to Israel and settled in Jerusalem since the early 1990s, and now constitute 12 percent of the city's Jewish population, Jerusalem absorbed fewer immigrants than other Israeli cities. For example, in Haifa, the immigrants from the former Soviet Union are 27 percent of the city's total population. The percentage of Russian immigrants reached 18 percent of the total Israeli population by the end of 2002.

The net Jerusalem Jewish migration is negative; the city is losing approximately one percent of its Jewish population yearly. The data for the year 2002 illustrates this trend: 9,700 Jews migrated to Jerusalem but 16,400 left, a decline of 6,600. Between 1990 and 2002, 125,500 Jews migrated to Jerusalem, compared to 207,400 who left. The migration balance for this period is about 81,700. In the 1990s, 54 percent of the Jews who left the city moved to settlements in the occupied areas around Jerusalem, while 27 percent who left moved to localities in the Jerusalem district west of Jerusalem.

In contrast, there is virtually no talk about Palestinian migration to Jerusalem. The “legal status” of Palestinian Jerusalemites, as permanent residents of Israel, is a condition for migration to the city. Thus, no Palestinian from the West Bank or Gaza has the free choice to live in Jerusalem. In the 1980s, 40-60 percent of Jerusalemites who had the blue Israeli ID cards lived in suburbs around Jerusalem. Since 1996, many have been returning to the city due to the Israeli “Center of Life” policy (discussed later in this report) and closures in the West Bank. Recently the construction of the wall, which excludes all suburbs and some city neighborhoods within the municipal boundaries, has intensified the return to the city. It is estimated that as many as 300 suburban families (which extrapolates to over 1200 family members) return to East Jerusalem each week because of the wall.

It is estimated that fewer than 20 percent continue to live in areas detached from the city, in many cases, keeping an address within the city in order to guarantee their residency right.

In 2005 the city of Jerusalem suffered from negative migration balance. The total migration balance was -5.8. Among the Israelis it was -5.5, while among the Palestinians was -0.3.

Muslim and Christian Trends

At the end of 1946, and just before the Nakba, Christians constituted 37.7 percent of Jerusalem’s population. In 1967, this had dropped to 18 percent (or 12,348) of the 68,600 Palestinians. This absolute figure remained relatively constant over the next several years. However, as a percentage of the East Jerusalem population, the Christian community has declined: by 1972 it was 14 percent; by 1983, 11.2 percent; and it was a mere 5.6 percent (12,437) by the end of 2002. Over the same period, the East Jerusalem Muslim population increased from 82 percent to 94.4 percent (209,662).

Historian Sami Hadawi, estimated that over 50 percent of Jerusalem’s Christians were expelled from their West Jerusalem homes. This is the largest single numerical decline of Christians in Palestine in history. Hadawi’s study concluded that in Jerusalem, a higher proportion of Palestinian Christians became refugees after 1949; a ratio of 37 percent of Christians to 17 percent of Muslims. The higher ratio of Christians was due in part to the fact that the majority lived in the wealthier western Jerusalem districts seized by Israel during the 1948 Nakba. Further, approximately 34 percent of the lands seized by Israel were owned by Palestinian Christian churches, and were simply taken by force. In 2005, the Muslim population was 232,300, with a 2.9% natural increase, and 3.4% annual growth, while the Arab Christian number was 12,300 people, with a 0.08% natural increase and a 1.6% annual growth.

Bernard Sabella reports that by 1966, the population of Palestinian Christians had declined to 13 percent of the total Palestinian population in Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank. This is a significant decline from the 18-20 percent that had held steady until 1947. However, following the 1967 war and continuing until the signing of the Oslo Accords, on 13 September 1993, the population decline was even more dramatic. Sabella places the number of Palestinian Christians at 2.1 percent in 1993. This decline was a direct reaction to the severity of the Israeli occupation and the lack of an economic, educational, vocational, and secure life in East Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank.

A second factor contributing to the Palestinian Christian decline lies in birthrates: the Christian birthrate is approximately one percent compared to the Muslim rate of four percent and higher. At present, there are an estimated 10,000 Palestinian Christians, including clergy. These Christians, belong to more than 14 different denominations.

A simple statistical compilation based on a two percent growth of the Christian population in Jerusalem in 1944 would predict that by 1979 the Christian population of the city should have doubled to 60,000. Using the same formula, Jerusalem's Christian population would be 120,000 by 2014. But the reality is that Christians in Jerusalem are disappearing. Some Palestinian scholars conclude that there is a disintegrating Christian Palestinian community within Jerusalem, which may disappear entirely, except for shrine custodians, within the next few decades.

Jerusalem Population by Age and Gender

Jerusalem is a young community, particularly within the Palestinian neighborhoods. By the end of 2004, 42.7 percent of the Palestinian population was under the age of 14; 22 percent of Christians, and 42.8 percent of Muslims. The percentage of youth among the Ultra-Orthodox Jews was even higher, 44. It was 31.2 percent for all Jews in the municipality. The median age of Palestinians in Jerusalem is 20, and 25 for the Jews. Data from the school year 2005/2006 show that 64,000 Palestinian students attend East Jerusalem schools, a number that represents 27 percent of the Palestinian population in Jerusalem. In 2004, the Palestinian population above the age of 65

was found to comprise only 3.44 percent of the Palestinian population; 2.95 percent among Muslims and 12.4 percent among Christians; 10.7 percent of Jews were above the age of 65 for the same year.

In 2004, the Palestinian population distribution by gender was 50.3 percent for males and 49.7 percent for females; or 50.6 percent of males (49.4 percent for females) among Palestinian Muslims, and 49.7 percent of males (50.3 percent for females) among the Christian community. On the other hand, the percentage of males among the Jewish community for the same year was 49.4, and 50.6 for females.

Population Distribution

Table 5 indicates that 13.8 percent of the Palestinians (33.8 thousand residents) lived in the Old City in 2005, compared to a 14.6 percent in 2002. More than 40 percent live in inner neighborhoods surrounding the Old City; and an additional 14.7 percent live in the southern neighborhoods (Jabal Al Mukabbir, As Sawahira Al Gharbiya, Sur Bahir, Um Tuba, and Beit Safafa). Almost one third of the Palestinians (29.2 percent) live in the northern part of the city (Kafr Aqab, Beit Hanina, and the neighborhood and refugee camp of Shu'fat) in the year 2003; (see **Map 3**). The wall now places parts or all of those communities outside the barrier.

Table 5. Palestinian Population Distribution by East Jerusalem Neighborhood 2003, 2004 and 2005

Neighborhood		Population (thousands)		
		2003	2004 ⁽¹⁾	2005 ⁽¹⁾
Old City	Christian Quarter	5,421	5,480	5,350
	Armenian Quarter	2,500	2,200	2,150
	Muslim Quarter	25,309	25,950	26,300
	Kafr Aqab	11,077	11,431	11,997
	Beit Hanina	22,511	23,931	24,820
	Shu'fat	32,076	33,402	34,761
	Shu'fat Refugee Camp			
	Al Isawiyya	10,997	11,340	11,810
	At Tur, Al Shayyah, As Suwana	20,723	21,686	22,370
	Wadi Al Joz	7,376	7,590	7,800

Sheikh Jarrah	9,395	9,724	10,135
Al Thuri (Abu Tur)	14,026	15,204	15,885
Silwan	14,511	15,220	15,844
Ras Al Amud	13,341	13,795	14,264
Jabal Al Mukabbir and As Sawahira Al Gharbiya	14,436	14,900	15,675
Sur Bahir and Um Tuba	12,080	12,590	13,315
Beit Safafa	7,150	7,410	7,750
Others	5,068	5,247	4,574
Total	228,000	237,100	244,800

Source: *The Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook, No. 20, 2002-2003.*

(1) Years of 2004 and 2005 based on estimation of trends of natural increase, migration and immigration between the Jerusalem neighborhoods.

In 2004-2005, IPCC surveyed the existing buildings in East Jerusalem. East Jerusalem was divided by neighborhoods. The import of the survey is to be found in the number of new buildings which were built between 1990 and 2004. The basic map of the buildings and data on the number of households in the buildings were updated by using the basic photogrametry map, an aerial photo, and field surveys. The field surveys uncovered a variation in development among East Jerusalem neighborhoods. We can distinguish the new households and buildings in Palestinian East Jerusalem neighborhoods from pre-existing buildings and households. The inner neighborhoods around the Old City, such as Bab As Sahira, Sheikh Jarrah and neighborhoods which do not attract immigration, such as As Sawahira,

are characterized by low growth in households and minimal new building construction. The second group are neighborhoods which in the past were villages that had completed an urbanization process, which was characterized by high natural population increases which had led to a demand for new housing to absorb the growth. In this group the immigration is limited. The third group includes neighborhoods, such as Beit Hanina and Shu'fat, which are characterized not only by high natural population growth but also positive immigration. **Figure 3** shows the dynamic of the building and household growth in East Jerusalem Palestinian neighborhoods, considering the level of urbanization, the openness of the neighborhoods to outsider immigration, potential of development and municipal policy to control development.

Figure 3. The Increase in the number of Buildings and Households in East Jerusalem Neighborhoods between 1990 and 2004





Figure 4 illustrates the increase in the number of Palestinian buildings by neighborhood in East Jerusalem. There was almost no increase in some neighborhoods such as Bab As Sahira; on the other hand, other neighborhoods had considerable increases in housing units between 2002 and 2004. **Figure 3** and **Figure 4** are based on a survey carried out by IPCC.

They show that the increase in the number of buildings varies in different areas of Jerusalem. This is due to a number of factors such as availability of land, commercial building, and the openness of the community to newcomers. In addition, internal migration within Jerusalem causes variation among the areas.


Figure 4. Number of Palestinian Housing Units in East Jerusalem in 2002 and 2004



Based on statistics from the Jerusalem Electricity Company Ltd. and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, there is a variation in the number of electricity subscribers in Jerusalem. The increase in the number of subscribers is an indicator of the population increase and demand on housing in


neighborhoods. It is obvious that there is a direct proportionality between the increase in buildings and households between 1990 and 2004, and the increase in electricity subscribers. This indicates that there is a big difference between the supply and demand on housing in various Palestinian neighborhoods.

Figure 5. Number of Palestinian Electricity Subscribers in East Jerusalem by Neighborhood in 1998, 2000 and 2002



Source: PCBS Yearbook No. 8, p. 131.

Figure 6. Number of Palestinian Electricity Subscribers in the Jerusalem Governorate by Neighborhood in 1998, 2000 and 2002




Source: PCBS Yearbook No. 8, p. 132.

As indicated in **Figure 6**, there are variations in the increase of the number of electricity subscribers among the towns and villages of Jerusalem Governorate. This figure shows the neighborhoods which had a huge increase in housing units and therefore an increase in the number of subscribers.

On the other hand, some villages had no increase in population and therefore essentially no increase in buildings or electricity subscribers. Examples of this are the villages in the northwest of Jerusalem compared to those in the north of Jerusalem such as Ar Ram and Bir Nabala.

Map 3: East Jerusalem Population Distribution in 2003 and 2005



Education

There are 117 schools and kindergartens in East Jerusalem: 44 are under the Israeli administrative system of the Jerusalem Education Authority and the Municipality of Jerusalem; 29 are public schools run by the Palestinian Authority (including the Waqf trust schools); 7 are UNRWA schools; and 37 are private schools. In the year 2005/2006, 13,371 pupils attended the private schools; 9,412 attended PA schools and 3,741 were enrolled in the UNRWA schools. The number of pupils studying in the Israeli municipal schools, according to the most recent available statistics of the year 2004/2005, was 42,063 which is 62.5 percent of the total pupils in the city. In 2004/2005 the number of the pupils studying in the municipal schools decreased by 3.2 percent compared to the year 2003/2004. The number of pupils at the Palestinian private and public schools increased by five percent in the years 2005/2006 compared to the previous learning year. In the year 2004/2005 the total number of classes in the municipal schools was 1,377. In the Palestinian private, UNRWA and public schools the total number of classes was 866. The average class size in the private and public schools under the PA is 27.4 compared to 31 in the municipal schools in the 2004-2005 school year. This compares to 24 in the Jewish schools.

A report ordered by the Municipality and

prepared by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies in 1994 indicated that in order to serve the 1995 school age population, 345 classrooms were needed immediately. In 2002 the Israeli master plan for education in East Jerusalem, also prepared by the Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies showed a shortage of 1,155 classrooms for the school-age population of East Jerusalem. Between the years 2002-2005 only 161 classrooms were constructed by the municipality, 213 were closed, a net loss of 52 classrooms. According to an Ir Amim report on education published in September 2006, approximately 14,500 Palestinian children in East Jerusalem are unknown to the education authorities. Where or whether these children attend schools at all is unclear.

Approximately 13 percent of East Jerusalem pupils are affected by the segregation wall and have to cross a check point to reach their school. Between 20-25 percent of the teachers and staff at the PA and the private schools in East Jerusalem are West Bankers who need a special permit to enter the city. Israel frequently delays or denies travel permits for such teachers and staff.

In the academic year 2004/2005 8,473 students attended the two universities in East Jerusalem (Al Quds University and Al Quds Open University); 50.7 percent are females. Approximately 50 percent of the university students are Jerusalemites with an Israeli residency card.

Table 6. PA Governmental⁽¹⁾, UNRWA and Private Schools, Pupils and Classes by Scholastic Year

Year	2004/2005			2005/2006		
	Schools	Pupils	Classes	Schools	Pupils	Classes
Government Schools	27	8,714	316	29	9,412	334
UNRWA	7	3,612	105	7	3,741	110
Private Schools	34	12,919	503	37	13,371	522
Total	68	25,245	924	73	26,524	966

(1) Including Waqf Schools.

Table 7. Municipal Education Schools, Pupils and Classes by Scholastic Year

Year	2003/2004	2004/2005
Schools	44	44
Pupils	43,477	42,063
Classes	1,477	1,377

Health

There are eight hospitals in East Jerusalem. The largest is Al Maqased Hospital which has 250 beds. The smallest is Dajani Maternity Hospital in Beit Hanina with 12 beds only. The total number of beds in East Jerusalem hospitals was 633 in 2003. The total number of admissions to these hospitals in 2003 was 28,823 patients compared to 30,234 in 2002. The restriction of movement and the construction of the wall has decreased the number of patients allowed to enter Jerusalem to receive treatment in East Jerusalem Hospitals. Seventy percent of the patients and eighty percent of the medical staff are West Bankers and must obtain permits from Israeli authorities prior to accessing the hospitals in East Jerusalem. Several of the hospitals in East Jerusalem are specialized: there is only one cancer center in the West Bank and Gaza (at the Augusta Victoria Hospital) and the only open heart surgery facility (in Al Maqased

Hospital); the only university training hospital is in East Jerusalem. Medical students of Al Quds University from the West Bank will be negatively effected by the wall; and it will be very difficult for them to receive permits to enter the city because of their young age. (Israeli permits generally require males to be married and at least age 35.)

More than 96 percent of the Palestinian Jerusalemites with an Israeli blue ID card are insured under the Israeli health system and are obliged by law to participate in the system. In the past ten years medical centers and clinics were established by subcontractors of the main Israeli health insurance foundation. The amount received by these subcontractors for each insured person registered at such centers and clinics is one third of what similar Israeli facilities receive for each insured. This obviously has a negative implication on the specialized medical services and the medical treatment given to the patient.

THE JERUSALEM ECONOMY



Salah Eddin commercial street, East Jerusalem. March 2007.

While it is true that the economy of the Palestinian Jerusalem District (or Governorate) is somewhat stronger than that of the rest of the West Bank and certainly that of the Gaza Strip, it remains a fact that the governorate economy has been in shambles for several years. Three generalizations provide the appropriate context for assessing the situation: 1) The levels of unemployment, poverty, dependency ratios, population density, and malnutrition among children are among the highest in the Middle East region; 2) The national incomes account data of its neighbor Israel are eight to ten times that of the governorate, which is among the highest differentials between any two neighboring states in the world; 3) Even from the Israeli perspective, the Jerusalem Municipality (which combines Palestinian East and Israeli

West Jerusalem) is the poorest urban area in Israel.

National Accounts

The most recent available macroeconomic data for the Palestinian Jerusalem District are from 2002. They are dismal. However, given the road closure and checkpoint policy that has continued to dampen the movement of goods and people, the advent of the wall which exacerbates that situation, the decline in tourism, and the documented increases in business closures, unemployment and poverty, it is indeed conservative to state that the 2006 data would be even more depressed. With that caveat, the 2002 data are given in **Table 8** below. (The J1 data refer to Palestinian East Jerusalem; J2 denotes the Palestinian suburbs.)

Table 8. National Accounts: Annual GDP-pc, GNDI-pc and GNI-pc (2002)

GDP per capita	J1	1365 USD
	J2/WB	1350 USD
GNI per capita	J1	2,004 USD
	J2/WB	1,431 USD
GNDI per capita	J1	2,194 USD
	J2/WB	1,779 USD

Source: *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook No. 8* (2006), The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Jerusalem, p. 247. The World Bank reports GNI data for West Bank and Gaza at a mere USD 930. In stark contrast, Israeli GNI-pc data for 2004 was 17,380 USD.

Sources of Personal Income

The sources of personal income in Palestinian Jerusalem differ from that of the West Bank and Gaza in two important respects: 1) agricultural income is a relatively negligible source; 2) East Jerusalemites are significantly less dependent upon income from government employment. This last factor is due to the prohibition that the Israeli occupation powers have against locating any Palestinian National Authority facilities within the Jerusalem Municipality. (The prohibition does not apply to the suburban area since the

Israelis consider that territory to be outside the municipality and in the West Bank.) It will be noted from the data in **Table 9** below that Jerusalemite personal income is very dependent upon employment in Israel. This is true even for the suburban areas. There, many residents have an East Jerusalem Israeli ID card that allows them to work in Israeli areas. This important source of income for all Jerusalemites will soon end: it is now official Israeli policy to replace Palestinian workers with foreign workers and with Israelis moving from welfare to work. No Palestinians are to be employed in Israel after the end of 2007.

Table 9. Sources of Personal Income (%): April – June 2005

Main Source of Income	J1	J2	Governorate
Agriculture and Fishing	0.4	2.2	1.1
Household business	14.4	19.0	16.0
Wages/Salaries from PA	5.3	15.0	8.8
Wages/Salaries from Private Sector	21.5	31.7	25.2
Income from employment in Israel	32.2	14.2	25.7
National Insurance	21.0	1.6	14.0
Transfers within Palestine Territories	0.1	4.5	1.7
Transfers from Abroad	0.5	3.0	1.4

Source: PCBS, "Main Findings," Social Survey of Jerusalem Governorate 2005, p. 104.

Employment

Sectors

An analysis of the sector employment data (**Table 10** below) indicates that the Jerusalem

economy has a major Service component. This is somewhat surprising in that there are very few government services offering employment in the area, and given the PCBS policy of treating employment in hotel, tourist services, and restaurants separate from the Service Sector.

Table 10. Overview of Governorate Employment and Distribution of Work Force by Sectors (%) 2005

Work Force Sector	J1	J2	Governorate
Construction	16.6	21.7	12.8
Manufacturing, Mining and Quarry	11.4	17.6	15.6
Services ⁽¹⁾	29.3	29.9	31.5
Commerce, ⁽²⁾ Hotels & Restaurants	32.3	21.3	28.9
Transportation, Storage, Communication	9.8	6.9	9.7
Agriculture	0.6	2.6	1.5
Total			100%

Source: *Yearbook No. 8*, p. 217 and PCBS *Social Survey 2005*, p.81.

⁽¹⁾ The PCBS Service Sector includes data for Public Administration; Education; Health, Welfare and Social Work Services; Community, Social, and Personal Services (including cultural); and Private Households with Domestic Personnel. Note: the PA provides no government services in J1 but some in J2.

⁽²⁾ Commerce here includes wholesale and retail trade and repairs and auto sales and repairs.

Employment, Income, Household Expense, and Poverty

Table 11. Selected Governorate Employment, Unemployment, Earnings, Spending, and Poverty Levels⁽³⁾

Labor Force Participation rate, ILO standard	37.2 %
Labor Force Participation rate, relaxed definition ⁽⁴⁾	40.8%
Employed in Israel or Settlements	J1 32.2%; J2 14.2 %; Gov. 25.7%
Unemployment rate, relaxed definition ⁽⁴⁾	24.0 %
Unemployment by ILO standards	16.8%
Underemployed	3.4 %
Average Daily Wages in Governorate	96.2 NIS (22 USD)
Average Daily Wages in Israel and Settlements	134.6 NIS (30 USD)
Average Monthly Wages in Governorate	2,357 NIS (523 USD) ⁽⁵⁾
Average Monthly Wages in Israel and Settlements	3,257 NIS (723USD) ⁽⁵⁾
Monthly Family Consumption	970 JD (6,256 NIS or 1,390 USD)
Monthly Household Expenditures	JD 870 (5611 NIS or 1,247 USD)
Households below poverty level (Oct.-Dec. 2004)	60.6% ⁽⁶⁾
Households losing more than 50% of income in last 6 months	51.6%

⁽³⁾ Data are for the governorate, year 2005, taken from *Yearbook No. 8*, 2006, pp. 186, 190, 194, 216, 218, 220-222, 385, and 405.

⁽⁴⁾ Includes long-time unemployed who are no longer actively seeking work.

⁽⁵⁾ Most of the workers do not receive monthly pay and the PCBS *Yearbook* does not report this datum. It is approximated here by calculating *average daily pay X average days worked per month*. An IPCC survey of 1200 households revealed the following monthly *family* incomes: 12% of the households surveyed had monthly incomes of less than 2,000 NIS (444 USD); 57% of the households reported a combined income of less than 4,000 NIS (888 USD) per month.

⁽⁶⁾ PCBS defines the poverty line here (p. 405) as household income less than 2,000 NIS (444 USD) per month. The World Bank poverty rate (2.30 USD per person per day, for the average governorate household of 5.3 persons) would yield a monthly poverty criterion of 1,646 NIS (366 USD)

Unemployment

Unemployment before the Second Intifada was appreciable by any industrialized state standards, running at 9.8 in 1999 and 11.2 in

2000, according to the formal or ILO definitions. In more recent years, under conditions of increased closure and the advent of wall construction, unemployment rose dramatically. **Table 12** charts the levels for 2002-2005.

Table 12. Unemployment in the Jerusalem Governorate: 2002 – 2005

Year	Formal (ILO) Standard	Informal (Relaxed) Standard
2002	27.8	41.1
2003	22.3	32.8
2004	22.8	29.6
2005	16.8	24.1

Source: PCBS Yearbook No. 8 (2006), pp. 224-225. Informal or relaxed standard data include the long-term unemployed who have become discouraged and are no longer actively seeking employment.

While the 2005 level of unemployment declined from the previous year, the conservative ILO level is almost double that of Israel (9%) and the informal level remains high. It would appear from the discussion below that the decrease in unemployment measures may be due to a substantial increase in tourism in 2005. Nevertheless, a 24.1% rate of informal unemployment, coupled with a 3.4% under-employment is alarming.

Tourism

According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, tourism in 2005 experienced a major revival in Israeli *West Jerusalem*: hotel person-nights increased 60% for the year;

and 60% of all visitors toured the Old City, including 80% of the Christian and Muslim tourists. Israeli tourism doubtless had a positive impact on tourism-related enterprises, including retailing, in East Jerusalem. Also East Jerusalem experienced an increase in hotel occupancy rates in 2005 over 2004 by 45%. (See **Table 13**) No other governorate sector shows a significant improvement between 2004 and 2005. In short, it would appear that the decline in 2005 unemployment may be attributed to activity in the tourism sector. That said, the Israel/Lebanon war which broke out in July 2006 caused a 30% decline in Israeli tourism for the third quarter of the year. This may dampen the increase in employment in East Jerusalem.

Table 13. Governorate Hotel Activity: 2000, 2004, and 2005

	2000	2004	2005
No. of Hotels	43	23	18
No. of Rooms	1,997	985	869
No. of Beds	4,345	2362	1,967
Average Room Occupancy	897	215	308
Room Occupancy Rate (%)	44.4%	23.0%	36.5%
Average of Bed Occupancy	1,824	353	513
Bed Occupancy Rate	42%	15%	26%
No. of Guests	206,583	44,514	64,784
No. of Guest Nights	665,929	128,843	187,284

Source: *Yearbook No. 8*, p. 283.

Governorate Enterprises

The number of businesses operating in the governorate (**Table 14**) increased significantly from 2003 to 2004 and remained relatively stable, showing a mild down-tick in 2005. Data for 2006 are not yet available, but given the number of business closures generated by the wall (especially in J2), the

down-tick will probably continue. In an IPCC study of just five governorate communities it was determined that over 500 enterprises had been closed by the effects of the wall. Doubtless, not all of these were bankruptcy cases; many moved to other communities less affected by the wall. Nevertheless, their departures impacted the economy of these communities significantly.

Table 14. Number of Governorate Enterprises Operating in the Private Sector (including Government Owned Businesses), 2004 – 2005

	2003	2004	2005
J1	2110	2591	2566
J2	2759	3367	3355
Total	4869	5958	5921

Source: PCBS Yearbook, Nos. 6, 7, and 8.

Trade

While it is difficult to segregate Palestinian Jerusalem external trade data out of OPT statistics, it is instructive to look at the combined EJ/WB/G activity. The first datum to be noted is that 90% of Palestinian trade is with or through Israel, and since East Jerusalem has a direct interface with Israel, we assume that the trade figure for the Governorate is at least comparable. Secondly, there has been a serious decline in Palestinian external trade: in the period 1999-2002 trade declined by more than 50%, and currently the annual trade deficit is running at two billion USD, or the equivalent of 50% of the annual GNP.

In addition to Israel, Palestine has free trade agreements with the USA, Canada, the EU, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Iceland, and Norway—but not with 20 Arab states. Indeed, only 5.7% of Palestine's 2004 trade was with Arab countries.

These agreements notwithstanding, Israel has effectively embargoed Palestinian goods by the imposition of closures at the Gaza Rafah crossing into Egypt and on truck convoys going from the West Bank to Gaza. In November 2005, in an agreement on the

movement of goods (the AMA agreement) brokered by the United States, Israel agreed to allow Palestine trade through the Rafah crossing unless there was an immediate security threat. Yet, as one Israeli critic has observed, the crossing "...is for all intents and purposes closed to Palestinian merchandise despite pledges by Defense Minister Peretz to keep [it] open as much as possible". David Kuttab, writing in the *Jerusalem Post* (November 27, 2006, p. 13) reports that the crossing has been closed 155 of the 310 working days that transpired after the agreement in 2005 and that the number of trucks that were allowed through, which according to the agreement was to begin at 150 and increase to 400 per day, has in fact been limited to an average of 18 trucks per day, when the crossing is opened. According to the USAID, Gaza closures cost the Palestinian economy 65 million USD in trade in 2005, or \$600,000 per day, of which \$400,000 per day was in agricultural losses. However, the crossing from Gaza into Egypt is only a part of the trade problem. Shortly after signing the AMA agreement, Israel cancelled an Oslo Accord provision that allowed convoy's of trucks to transport goods from the West Bank to Gaza and no truck (or bus) convoys have operated to this date.

Housing



Housing density in Silwan neighborhood. 2005.

Available Land and Housing Density

Large tracts of Palestinian private land (more than 40 percent) in East Jerusalem were designated “green areas” through Israeli zoning ordinances. Building and development is prohibited. According to Rassem Khamaisi, this has left only 7 percent of the total area of Jerusalem (or 12.7 percent of the area of East Jerusalem) available for the Palestinian housing and community development needs. (See **Map 4**). The following figure illustrates the decrease and diminution of lands allocated for Palestinian development including housing in East Jerusalem.

At the end of 2005, there were approximately 47,000 families (5.2 average family size) in East Jerusalem. The household average size among Palestinians was 5.6 compared to 3.2 among Israelis. According to the municipal tax data from 2001, the average size of an apartment in Jerusalem (east and west combined) is 75


m². The average apartment size is 73.8 m² in the Palestinian neighborhoods, compared to 76.5 m² in the Israeli neighborhoods and settlements. In many Palestinian neighborhoods, apartment sizes are very small, to the extent that the average size of an apartment in Shu'fat Refugee Camp is 35 m², and in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City it is only 41 m². The average number of rooms per house in municipal East Jerusalem is 3.2, and in the rest of the Governorate it is 3.5. Indeed, only 10.7 percent of the houses inside the municipal area have five or more rooms. The resulting room density for East Jerusalem areas in 2001 is 1.9 persons per room, down from 2.3 in 1990, but still almost double the housing density of West Jerusalem.

The consequences of these characteristics are apparent in the housing conditions of many Palestinian neighborhoods, where 62 percent of the Palestinians live in a condition of extreme overcrowding. Palestinian neighborhoods

occupy the lowest levels of the socioeconomic scale and are inferior to that of the Ultra-Orthodox Jews, many of whom live mainly on

welfare programs. Indeed the Palestinian and the Jewish Ultra-Orthodox socioeconomic indicators have made Jerusalem, the poorest city in Israel.

Figure 7. Decrease in Land areas allocated for Palestinian Development in East Jerusalem 1967–2006



Source: R. Khamaisi, *Conflict Over Housing: The Housing Sector in Jerusalem*. IPCC: Jerusalem, 2006. p 79.

The density problem is a result of the Israeli housing and planning policy, which has aimed at restricting Palestinian construction and development, and the process of housing providing, which is based on the self-housing method. Since 1967 (until 2004, only about 20,000 housing units have been built by Palestinians that is one apartment for every additional 8 persons. Most of this development was due to private initiative and on family-owned land. However, during the same period, 72,000 Jewish settlement housing units were built

within East Jerusalem. This is in addition to the 18,000 settlement units built in “Greater Jerusalem” outside the municipal boundaries. Most of the Israeli buildings were a government initiative that provided very generous incentives to attract Israelis to the settlements. (Settlement building is discussed in detail later.)

However, the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are not only living in inferior and deteriorating housing conditions, but also encounter a discriminatory policy that



Advertisements and incentives encouraging settler activities. 2005.

deprives them of their rights of housing, a policy which makes obtaining building permits almost impossible.

Table 15 illustrates the fees and levies required for obtaining a building permit for a 200 square meter house on half a dunum.

Table 15. Fees and Levies for Obtaining a Building Permit for a 200 sq.m. House on Half a Dunum

Item	Fee (NIS)
Opening of File	About 2,000
Road Development Fee – Building	14,800
Development Fee – Lot	18,500
Sewage Fee – Lot	15,525
Water Mains Connection Fee	5,025
Water Mains Development Fee	17,606
PRP	About 15,000
Betterment Levy	About 12,800
Total	About 109,492

Source: M. Margalit, *Discrimination in the Heart of the Holy City*. IPCC: Jerusalem, 2006. p 50.

It is worth mentioning that despite the economic gap between East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem, the fact that 70% of Palestinian Jerusalemites are under the poverty line, and the fact that Palestinians build by private family initiatives rather than government collective housing, Israelis and Palestinians are still treated by the same expensive parameters when it comes to obtaining building permits, which makes obtaining a permit unaffordable for most

Palestinian families.

More than half of the Palestinian housing units in East Jerusalem are considered by the Israeli authorities to be illegal [Margalit 10:1]. Between 15,000 and 20,000 housing units are considered to be illegal. Since 1967, Israel has demolished about 2,000 Palestinian houses in East Jerusalem. Up to 1,500 Palestinian residential buildings are currently under demolition orders, and 2,000 others are awaiting the order.



Housing density in Isawiyya neighborhood. 2007.

The Threat of Green

Open spaces, colored dark or light green, on the municipality maps are areas where construction is totally forbidden. In a neutral planning system this regulation would be to protect greenery and urban open spaces on the neighborhood and regional levels. In East Jerusalem's case, however, this regulation serves to restrict Palestinian development and to isolate or "protect" the Israeli settlements. The Israeli open public spaces are extensive. They occur within urban spaces and in small areas designated as parks and green valleys. The Palestinian open spaces are exclusively around the built-up areas (normally a few meters from the main roads such as the case in New Beit Hanina) and are designated as a "green area" by the municipality.

Wide, over-expanded belts of open space "green areas" are imposed on East Jerusalem. Thirty-seven thousand dunums (9,250 acres) or 44 percent of Palestinian-owned land in East Jerusalem are zoned as 'green areas'. Such zoning is a constant threat to Palestinians who intend to build a home only to discover that their hopes are painted green on the mayor's table. The green areas are the only reserved lands for future Palestinian development; in most cases they are not landscaped and not even minimally verdant but are in fact essentially barren and actually rocky.

As a result of the Israeli partisan planning policies, Palestinian land owners have developed individual survival initiatives with small scale contractors. Without physical plans, and lacking incentives from the central and local government, on their own they build with limited financial, technical, and administrative resources. In the late 1990s hundreds of houses were built in the rocky green zones, especially in the north and the east neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. Despite the fact that houses built in green areas are subject to demolition and have no infrastructure services, people still risk their investment and prefer to live in fear and

under harsh living conditions rather than lose their right to reside in Jerusalem. The construction of semi-slum areas in the green areas will exhaust the potential reserve of land for housing projects of higher density and quality in East Jerusalem.

Case studies: Beit Hanina and Sur Bahir

New Beit Hanina is a Palestinian neighborhood in East Jerusalem whose development is restricted from the East by the Israeli road system that leads to settlements-- Road No. 1 and from the west by Road No. 404/4. In addition to these restrictions, a vast area of its lands is designated "green" on the municipality plans, an open space in which building is prohibited. People who break this law face the risk of house demolition. The map below shows part of New Beit Hanina. The border of the green area almost exactly corresponds to the line of the already built-up space and effectively prohibits further development or building. The empty lands that are not designated green, which do not satisfy housing needs even today, are the only "reserve" for future Palestinian expansion in East Jerusalem on the municipality plans. This has forced the Palestinians, who are in urgent need for homes inside the city boundaries, to develop individual survival initiatives of building in "green" lands illegally with limited financial, technical and administrative resources. By taking this decision, Palestinian families--in the red buildings--live in tragic housing conditions, with dilapidated infrastructure, and under constant fear of home demolition. Again we note that the "green" areas are nothing but barren rocky land that is not suitable for serving as an open space for greenery and public parks.

The village of Sur Bahir is a few kilometers south of the Old City. Since 1967, the village has lost more than 8,000 dunums of its original privately-owned 10,000 dunums of land to Israeli confiscation to build the settlements of East Talpiyot (northwest), and Har Homa (southwest). Additional land confiscation and a loss of land occurred in 2000 due



Designated green area, demolished and "illegal" houses in Wadi Ad Dam - West Beit Hanina. 2006.

Figure 8. Green Area and "Illegal Houses" in Beit Hanina




Figure 9. Green Area and “Illegal Houses” in Sur Bahir



An overview of south Sur Bahir and Um Tuba from Har Homa. 2004.

to construction of the wall which passes southeast of the village. Like all Palestinian communities, wide areas of the remaining lands of Sur Bahir are designated green on the municipality plans in an attempt to limit development and growth. The loss of developable lands to expropriation for settlements and the wall has left the people with no other choice but to employ the individual survival method of building where they own land, the so-called “green”

area.

A Palestinian family looks through the remains of their demolished home in At Tur neighborhood. Photo by Gottfried Kraatz (EAPPI). December 2006.

Building Expansion

Based on an estimation by R. Khamaisi in *Conflict Over Housing: the Housing Sector in Jerusalem (IPCC 2006)*, 48,039 residential units on an area of 12,000 dunums were already needed by the

Palestinian population in Jerusalem in the year 2005. The same study showed that by 2020, 83,333 residential units would be needed to accommodate the Palestinian Jerusalemite population. This number of residential units would require an allocation of at least 16,666 dunums of land for housing in Jerusalem. As shown in **Figure 7**, the land allocated for Palestinian development, including housing, is only 12.7% of the area of East Jerusalem, or a total of 9,000 dunums, an area which is not

sufficient for Palestinian housing even today, much less in 2020.

Tables 16 and **17** illustrate estimated required housing units in Palestinian neighborhoods and the land area needed for building, and estimations for possible additions to residential units in different Palestinian neighborhoods according to approved and un-approved plans by the year 2020.

Table 16. Required Housing Units and Building Area by 2020

Year	Population (Thousands)	Meters per Person (m ²)	Average Family Size	Average Apartment Size (m ²)	Number of Units Needed	Land Area Needed for Construction (m ²)	Total Land Area Needed for Construction (dunums)
2005	245	15	5.1	74	48,039	3,554.80	12,009 (4 units per dunum)
2010	278	20	4.8	96	57,916	5,556.00	14,479 (4 units per dunum)
2015	324	22	4.6	101	70,435	7,113.90	15,652 (4.5 units per dunum)
2020	375	25	4.5	112	83,333	9,333.30	16,666 (5 units per dunum)

Source: R. Khamaisi, *Conflict Over Housing: The Housing Sector in Jerusalem*. IPCC: Jerusalem, 2006. p 101.

Table 17. Possible Housing Units in Approved and Un-approved Plans for Palestinian Neighborhoods and Expectations by Year 2020

Planning Area	Current Residential Units	Approved and In Process Plans			Increase by Filling in and Increasing Density				Total unit Additions Until 2020		Total Existing and Planned Units Until 2020	
		Residential Units in Approved Plans			Filling in Existing Areas		Increasing Density in Existing Areas		Maximum Possible	Actual Possible*	Maximum possible	Actual possible*
		Maximum Possible	Actual Possible*	Existing + Planned	Maximum Possible	Actual Possible*	Maximum Possible	Actual Possible				
Kafr Aqab	1,435	2.120	1.596	3.089	0	0	1.120	1.120	3.240	2.716	4.733	4.209
Atarot/ Qalandiya	22	0	0	148	0	0	111	111	111	111	259	259
Beit Hanina	9,419	8.827	6.622	13.880	4.398	2.859	5.443	5.443	18.668	14.924	25.926	22.182
Shu'fat RC	1,500	0	0	3.850	0	0	975	975	975	975	4.826	4.826
Isawiyya	1,995	2.120	1.475	3.939	780	507	1.848	1.848	4.748	3.830	7.212	6.294
Wadi Al Joz	2,375	1.431	1.077	3.591	0	0	636	636	2.067	1.713	4.581	4.227
At Tur	3,151	550	413	2.920	0	0	588	561	1.138	974	3.645	3.481
Old City	5,122	0	0	4.530	0	0	0	0	0	0	4.530	4.530
Silwan	5,961	1.155	880	8.268	1.536	998	3.415	3.415	6.106	5.293	13.494	12.681
Jabal Al Mukabbir	3,150	877	658	3.467	4.892	3.180	1.854	1.854	7.623	5.692	10.432	8.501
Sur Bahir	1,889	3.440	2.593	4.041	456	296	1086	1086	4.982	3.975	6.430	5.424
Beit Safafa	1,697	3.544	1.872	3.251	0	0	1.034	1.034	4.578	2.906	5.957	4.285
Al Walaja	240	0	0	77	2.400	480	58	58	2.458	538	2.535	615

Total	37,986	24,064	17,186	55,051	14,462	8,320	18,168	18,142	56,694	43,648	94,559	81,513
-------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	-------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------

Source: R. Khamaisi, *Conflict Over Housing: The Housing Sector in Jerusalem*. IPCC: Jerusalem, 2006. p 105.

* Taking into consideration percentage of usage until year 2020.



A Palestinian family looks through the remains of their demolished home in At Tur neighborhood. Photo by Gottfried Kraatz (EAPPI). December 2006.

Municipal Taxes

Table 18. Arnona Tax Rates in East Jerusalem, 2003

	West Jerusalem	% of Total	East Jerusalem	% of Total
Residential	446,370,000 NIS	62	59,450,000 NIS	40
Business	314,700,000 NIS	36	29,400,000 NIS	9

Source, Meir Margalit, *Discrimination in the Heart of the Holy City*. Jerusalem: IPCC, 2006, p. 138.

According to Meir Margalit, the claim that the Jerusalem Municipality invests a vastly greater sum in East Jerusalem than the Arnona taxes paid into the Municipality's coffers by Palestinian residents is not correct. He confirms that the percentage of East Jerusalem's population that paid Arnona tax in 2003 is high, especially when one takes into consideration the financial difficulties Palestinian Jerusalemites currently experience. The Palestinian population is under considerable economic duress, yet it contributes significant sums toward municipal expenses – in spite of the fact that it has virtually no say over how the money is spent,

as a normal citizenry would. Palestinians are forced to pay this tax; if they do not it would be utterly impossible for Palestinian Jerusalemites to obtain such vital documents from the Israeli authorities as identification cards, travel permits, birth certificates for their children, etc. Meanwhile, the Orthodox Jewish population, which is a sizable Jerusalem population that experiences financial hardship and lives on welfare, is provided with the full range of municipal services despite its poor record of tax payment. The difference is that the Orthodox do not need proof of payment of Arnona to receive such basic documents

as travel permits and Jerusalem ID cards, birth certificates, or services such as health care, as is the case with Palestinian Jerusalemites. Members of the Orthodox sector of the Jewish population may take full advantage of the Israeli system, while paying less in taxes than many of their Palestinian counterparts.

It is important to note that by law, even if residents of East Jerusalem paid no Arnona taxes, the Municipality would be obliged to provide services equally, without any relation to the amount of money collected. The Municipality claims sovereignty over East Jerusalem; it has a legal responsibility to its residents. Thus, in all matters pertaining to the provision of municipal services and infrastructure, rate of payment data are irrelevant, since the Municipality is obliged to provide service and infrastructure regardless of the level of the rate of payments.

Residency and the “Center of Life” Policy

Immediately after the occupation in 1967, the Israeli government conducted a census and in accordance with the 1952 Law of Entry into Israel, Palestinians were classified not as citizens but as “permanent residents of Jerusalem.” This means that Israel had annexed the land without annexing the people. Israel used the 1952 Law of Entry to Israel and the 1974 Entry to Israel Regulations as “legal” instruments to control the number of Palestinians who reside in the city. This was done through implementing what is called the “Center of Life policy.” Under this policy, anyone is subject to losing his or her right to live in Jerusalem if they do not prove that municipal Jerusalem is their “center of life.” That is, every Palestinian resident has to pay dwelling, and other taxes and to prove that he/she works and lives within the municipal boundaries and sends his/her children to schools inside Jerusalem. Their status as residents provides certain social net and entitlement benefits including health insurance and the welfare system.

Before 1996 (the year of approval of the law of “Jerusalem as a Center of Life” in the Israeli Knesset), this policy had only involved Palestinians who had lived abroad for more than seven years. However, since 1996, it now includes Palestinians who live outside of the Jerusalem municipal boundaries, encompassing those who live in the suburbs of Jerusalem and within the West Bank. Palestinians from East Jerusalem live in these suburbs because of the attractiveness of the availability of land and housing, the lower taxes and the fewer building restrictions.

Thus, after the issuing of the above-mentioned law, many Palestinian Jerusalemites who had moved to suburbs and Palestinian cities in the West Bank, lost their right of residence in the city. Since 1967, over 6,500 Palestinians have had their right to reside in East Jerusalem revoked. This has caused thousands of Palestinians, who were unwilling to lose their residency rights, to panic and return to live within the municipal boundaries of East Jerusalem. This has added to the housing and neighborhood densities, because many of them returned to live with relatives in the same house, or were forced to hastily build houses without obtaining the required building permits, a process which would have required much time and money. In 2003 alone, 272 people had their “legal” right to reside in Jerusalem revoked, and 16 in 2004.


Another “legal” policy, which is also meant to control the demographic balance for the benefit of Jewish super-superiority, is the Israeli government decision to stop the process of all “family unification” applications submitted by non-resident spouses in May 2002. On July 2003, the Knesset approved a bill to prevent Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens or residents from receiving Israeli permanent residency status or citizenship. This new law will turn many Palestinians living in the city with their families into illegal residents. As a consequence, they will be subject to arrest and many will be deported from the city to the West Bank areas.

ID Revocation

Between 1967 and 2004, at least, 6,400 Palestinians lost their Jerusalem ID cards. Based on data from the Ministry of Interior, 2,130 IDs were revoked for Palestinians who were

relocated abroad, and 382 of those relocated to Palestinian areas outside the Jerusalem municipal boundary. **Figure 10** illustrates the number of Palestinians whose IDs were revoked in selected years between 1967 and 2004.

Figure 10. Number of Palestinians who lost ID cards and residency rights for selected years 1967 – 2004



Source: http://www.btselem.org/english/Jerusalem/Revocation_Statistics.asp

* Data in 2001 till the end of April.

The New Israeli Jerusalem Master Plan

In August 2004, a final report of the proposed Jerusalem master plan was presented to the public. This new master plan is the first statutory plan which has approached the city as a unit since 1959, and after the annexation of East Jerusalem in the aftermath of the 1967 war. The main goal of the plan, as stated in its report is, "to introduce a new thought of planning and an inclusive plan which aim to continue developing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and a metropolitan center for the benefit of its residents and their quality of life." The master plan consists of seven thematic plans for land use: the city center, open areas, building patterns, historical heritage and ancient areas, transportation and roads, infrastructure, and environmental sensitivity. The master plan includes a textual description of the seven plans and a code of standards that clearly specifies their allowances and restrictions. According to the code of standards, the plans that refer to land use, city center, building patterns, and historical heritage and antique areas will be obliging, while the other plans will be instructing only. (see **Map 4**)

The plan reserves and anchors the existing situation: the Israeli open public space is an intensive space within the urban space. There are small areas designated as parks and valleys, while the Palestinian open space is an exclusive space surrounding the built-up areas and designated by the municipality as "green areas." They separate Palestinian built-up areas from Israeli settlements.

The demographic majority of Jewish residents were referred to many times as a term of reference to the proposed plan. The planning and development policies are directed by the demographic policy of an asymmetrical "balance" between Palestinians and Israelis that supposedly needs to be preserved. This report (Report Number 4) admitted that the

target ratio of 70% Jewish/30% Palestinians is not "realistic" and accepts the population projection of the Palestinians to be around 60 percent by the year 2020. (The expected population by year 2020 is 950,000, 62 percent Jewish, 38 percent Palestinians.)

This plan establishes a direct connection between the migration of the Jewish Jerusalemites to the new periphery settlements and the subsequent low living standards and environmental qualities of the city. Introducing a higher quality of life is considered by the plan as a necessary condition to attract new population and to minimize the emigration of Jewish people from Jerusalem especially of young people, middle class and educated people..

The master plan clearly states that "building new Jewish neighborhoods" is--and will continue to be--used to guarantee a Jewish majority in Jerusalem. New settlements will be built on pre-designated "green land" in East Jerusalem, to the east of Har Homa settlement, in the Mar Elias area on the main road to Bethlehem, and even in environmentally sensitive areas in Shu'fat, in order to extend the settlement of Rekhesh Shu'fat. The plan also includes the 15 km² of annexed land west of the Jerusalem Municipal boundary for the purpose of building new neighborhoods with a high standard of living.

The plan indicates that the construction capacity in Jerusalem for new residential units is 131,200 on the Jewish side and 35,400 on the Palestinian side. The method to build this number of housing units is by increasing the density in the existing Palestinian neighborhoods by allowing building heights up to four floors in most neighborhoods and up to six floors in the northern neighborhoods of Beit Hanina and Shu'fat; the second method

is by the fill-in development in areas in the existing locally approved town scheme plans of the neighborhoods. The proposed master plan does not refer to any possibility of building new Palestinian neighborhoods and no land is designated for that purpose. On the contrary, more land is expropriated from East Jerusalem for the benefit of Israeli settlements. According to this plan 13,000 residential units will be built in new settlements between Gilo and Har Homa. This plan allocates only 2,300 dunums for Palestinian building in areas mainly within the existing built-up area compared to 9,500 dunums for the Israelis, mainly in new settlements. The number of potential housing units to be built by 2020 for Palestinians does not take into consideration the existing 15,000-18,000 "illegal" houses built between 1996 and 2003. Conspicuously, the plan does not refer to any operational methods to upgrade the infrastructure, services, public buildings and the road system which is the direct responsibility of the Municipality.


While the master plan does not provide for the allocation of lands or the possibility of creating new neighborhoods for the Palestinians, the detailed plan for the Old City states that new neighborhoods will be built if residents are forced to relocate. The detailed plan also

articulates the goal of ending the demographic crowding in the Old City, which is mainly Palestinian, and it discusses developing planning tools for the renovation of the Old City residential areas to a sufficient standard. In addition, the plan refers to the need to assemble an administrative organization to enforce rules and regulations in the Old City.

Despite the major effect of the wall on the Palestinians, and the cutting off of some neighborhoods from the city and from the West Bank, this plan totally neglects the existence of the separation wall and its social and economic impact on the city and its surroundings.

With respect to the economy, the plan does not suggest new industrial and employment areas or commercial zones for economic development in the east part of the city. It also ignores the enhancement of cultural and institutional activities in the city. At the same time, it does not show any intention to develop the public transportation system in East Jerusalem, although it includes the light railway that passes within only one neighborhood in East Jerusalem (Shu'fat); it functions mainly to serve Israelis living in settlements in the north of East Jerusalem.

Map 4: Planned Master Plan of Jerusalem 2020



Israeli Settlements

East Jerusalem Settlements

In addition to the formal political legal annexation acts, Israel set in motion a series of policies designed to create “strong facts on the ground.” A two-fold strategy was adopted and implemented with great speed and energy. First, as a means of establishing a strong Jewish physical presence over all of East Jerusalem and its surrounding areas, a massive program of Jewish settlement building was carried out. The establishment of these settlements was not a private initiative. It was planned and initiated by the Government of Israel. Second, the Israeli authorities sought to maintain - and if possible even enlarge - the Jewish demographic majority by providing incentives for Israeli Jews to move to the settlements, while at the same time ignoring the need for Palestinian neighborhood expansion planning and otherwise stymieing the development of East Jerusalem.

Following the geopolitical act of annexing East Jerusalem, the Israeli government

confiscated more than 30,000 dunums (7,500 acres) encompassing 34 percent of Jerusalem’s Palestinian land, for building the Jewish settlements.

New Jewish settlements were established inside the area which was annexed by Israel after 1967. By June 1993, the Israeli Municipality could declare that more Israelis live in East Jerusalem settlements (including Gilo, East Talpiyot, Ramot, French Hill, Ramat Eshkol, Pisgat Ze’ev, and Neve Ya’akov), than Palestinians who live in East Jerusalem (160,000 compared to 155,000). In the end of 2004, the number of Israelis who lived in East Jerusalem settlements represented 39 percent of the total Jewish population of Jerusalem. Between 2000 and 2004 the number of Israelis who lived in these settlements increased by 4.3 percent. These settlements are under Israeli law and jurisdiction; the Jerusalem Municipality provides them with services. Administrative bodies for each settlement informally represent the residents in the municipality.

Table 19. Israeli Settlements in East Jerusalem by Year of Establishment, Area and Population: 2000, 2003 and 2005 (see Map 5)

Settlement Name	Establishment Year	Area (dunum)	Population		
			2000	2003	2005*
Ramat Eshkol	1968	1,365	14,429	14,744	14,940
Ramat Shlomo (Rekhes Shu’fat)	1994	1,126	11,348	13,390	14,250
East Talpiyot	1973	1,195	12,845	12,591	12,880
Atarot	1970	3,327	Industrial area		
Ramat Alon	1973	4,979	37,934	39,383	40,350
Neve Ya’akov	1972	1,759	20,288	20,250	20,300
Pisgat Ze’ev	1985	5,467	36,469	38,684	39,400
Giv’at Shapira (French Hill)	1968	970	8,193	7,874	7,960
Mount Scopus	1968	1,048			
Gilo	1971	2,859	27,637	27,569	27,720

Giv'at Hamatos	1991	310	463	2,152	2,310
Har Homa	1991	25,823	300		
Total		26,931	172,248	176,637**	180,110***

* Source: Estimate Based on the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003 and *the Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem*, and http://www.jiis.org.il/imageBank/File/shnaton_2004/shnaton_c1404.pdf.

** Including 2,404 Jews who live in the Jewish Quarter and 1,606 settlers in the Muslim and Christian Quarters.

*** Including 2,350 Jews who live in the Jewish Quarter and 1,650 settlers in the Muslim and Christian Quarters.



Pisgat Ze'ev settlement. 2007.

Greater Jerusalem Settlements

The Israeli settlements form a circular belt that disrupts Palestinian geographic and demographic continuity inside East Jerusalem. This belt is surrounded by a second one located inside the suburban Palestinian Jerusalem Governorate. These settlements

include Ma'aleh Adumim, Kokhav Ya'akov, Giv'at Ze'ev, Har Adar, Gush Etzion and others. (See **Map 6**).

Within the outer circle, there is also a scheme known as the E-1 Plan, which seeks to connect Ma'aleh Adumim with other settlements within the circle and to create



Ma'aleh Adumim settlement. 2006.

a geographic and demographic contiguity that extends through East Jerusalem into West Jerusalem. This “contiguity” will contain major commercial establishments and tourist attractions as well as residential settlements.

Some of these settlements, like Ma’aleh Adumim, are run by municipal councils, while others such as Giv’at Ze’ev are run by local administration. Small settlements on the other hand, are run through local or regional councils and Jerusalem is also considered

their center. Israel includes settlements within Bethlehem and Ramallah Districts as part of “Greater Jerusalem”, which is an area of 440 km² that encompasses the outer ring of settlements, such as Efrat (7,200), Etzion Settlements (7,000) and Betar Illit (24,900). (See **Map 11**).

Table 20 contains data on the Israeli settlements in “Greater Jerusalem” by their year of establishment, area and population for the years 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006.

Table 20. Israeli Settlements in Greater Jerusalem, Year of Establishment, Area and Population in selected years: 2000 – 2006

Settlement	Location	Distance from the Green line (km)	Establishment	Area**	2000	2002	2004	2006*
Almon (Anatot)	East – Within the Wall	6.9	1982	1,540	698	721	739	787
Alon	North East - Within the Wall	12.6	1990	220	1100	N.A.	N.A.	120 fam.
Alon Shvut	South West	4.6	1970	1050	2,680	3,030	3,229	3,235
Bat Ayin	South West	2.8	1989	1450	610	685	796	841
Betar Illit	South West	0.4	1980	3970	15,800	20,200	24,895	28,023
Efrat	South West	6.5	1980	4460	6,430	6,810	7,273	7,695
Ein Prat	East – Within the Wall	4.7	1998	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1 fam.
Geva Binyamin (Adam)	North East – Outside the Wall	6.6	1984	380	1,020	1,570	2,032	2,857
Gevat Ha Tatamar	South West	3.8	2001	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Giv’at Ze’ev	North West – Within the Wall	4.9	1983	5,000	10,300	10,600	10,635	11,009
Giv’on	North West – Within the Wall	4.5	1978	820	350	NA	NA	NA
Giv’on Ha Hadasha	North West – Within the Wall	4	1980	1,270	1,190	1,220	1,179	1,264
Gva’ot	South West - Within the Wall	1.8	1997	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	11 fam.
Har Adar	North West – Within the Wall	0	1986	1,032	1,420	1,730	2,074	2,459
Har Gilo	South West	1.8	1972	870	369	357	371	430

Har Shmuel	North West – Within the Wall	12.5	1996	1,300	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Kfar Adumim	East – Within the Wall	10.6	1979	934	1,690	1,790	2,006	2,310
Kfar Etzion	South West	4.7	1967	720	427	408	416	544
Kokhav Ya'akov	North East – Outside the Wall	7.7	1985	1,730	1,640	3,250	4,389	5,122
Ma'aleh Adumim	East – Within the Wall	4.5	1975	53,000	24,900	26,500	28,923	32,372
Mesu'at Yitzhak	South West	3.5	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Migdal Oz	South West	7.4	1977	580	289	268	313	411
Mishor Adumim***	East – Within the Wall	6.5	1974	4,100	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Neve Daniel	South West	4.2	1982	1070	933	1,020	1,225	1,568
Ofer	North West – Within the Wall	15.1	1975	1750	1,880	2,060	2,264	2,599
Kedar	East – Within the Wall	6	1985	494	447	585	658	722
Rosh Tzurim	South West	3.9	1969	636	265	247	298	457
Sha'ar Binyamin***	North East – Outside the Wall	6.5	1998	600	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Tal Tzion	North East – Outside the Wall	8.0	2000	1800	100	600	1400	1800

Source: Peace Now Movement, 2006; <http://www.peacenow.org.il>

* Data until June, 2006.

** Some of the areas are based on graphic calculation.

*** Sha'ar Binyamin and Mishor Adumim are an industrial parks.



Kidmat Zion Settlement in Abu Dis. 2006.



The Nof Zion Settlement under construction in Jabal Al Mukabbir. 2007. Source: <http://www.kehillot-tehilla.com/>



In addition to the settlements listed in **Tables 19** and **20**, there are ten settlement points in the heart of the Palestinian neighborhoods. They house approximately 2,000 settlers, most of whom are members of the fanatic extreme right. The main locations of these settlements are Silwan, Ras Al Amud, Sheikh Jarrah, Ath Thuri and the Old City. More settlements are planned in the heart of the Palestinian neighborhoods, especially those in Abu Dis and Jabal Al Mukabbir.

Most settlements are densely populated and enjoy cultural, educational and commercial services, as well as modern and new infrastructure and utilities. The settlers generally

are middle and lower class, and work in the service and industrial sectors. Some, such as the Ultra-Orthodox Haredi may not work but attend various religious training institutes.

Clear differences exist between the Israeli settlements and the Palestinian towns and villages. This is evident in housing style and availability, infrastructure and service provision, as well as social and economic conditions. The Israeli settlements are established to achieve political objectives (i.e. territorial, physical and resources control), while at the same time obstructing the development of Palestinian areas. On the other hand, Palestinian areas have developed as a private initiative of land owners and small scale contractors, without physical



Expansion in the northwest of Ramat Shlomo (Rekhes Shu'fat) Settlement. 2007.

plans, without the guidance and support of a central body, and with only limited financial, technical and administrative resources.

The E-1 Expansion Plan

E-1 stands for East 1, an expansion to the east of Jerusalem that confiscates 12,000 dunums (12 km²) of land from the Palestinian neighborhoods of At Tur, Al Isawiyya and Al Eizariya. E-1 is located northwest of the largest settlement in the West Bank, one of the few that are considered cities and run their own municipalities; Ma'aleh Adumim is populated by 30,000 settlers. The E-1 plan is to construct 3,500 residential units, which can accommodate up to 20,000 settlers, as well as tourist and attraction areas.

E-1 as part of the Ma'aleh Adumim settlement:

Although E-1 isn't a part of the Ma'aleh Adumim settlement expansion plan, it will be under the sovereignty of the Ma'aleh Adumim municipality. Ma'aleh Adumim municipality consists of an area of 53,000 dunums, of which 7,000 dunums is built up area, making Ma'aleh Adumim larger than Tel Aviv/ Jaffa and almost the same size area as West Jerusalem. The expansion area for Ma'aleh Adumim towards the east is three times the area of E-1, and the population increase between the years 2000 and 2004 exceeded 10%.


The E-1 plan approval progress:

The plan implementation started during the period of the government of Yitzhak Rabin in the year 1994, when the E-1 area was added to the municipality of Ma'aleh Adumim. But for political reasons, the government could not carry out any construction projects in the area. In the period of the Netanyahu government, a master plan was created to prepare for detailed plans for construction, which included the area of Ma'aleh Adumim and its surroundings under the dominion of the Greater Jerusalem Area, however, because of pressure from the United States of America, Netanyahu had to put the plan and the proposal for a Greater Jerusalem Area on hold.

In the year 2002, during Sharon administration, the minister of the Israeli Army approved the E-1 plan but kept his commitment to the USA by not implementing the construction during his period in office. In 2004 the Israeli government through the ministry of housing, prepared the infrastructure for the roads according to the E-1 plan, as well as the new headquarters for the Israeli Police Department in the E-1 area.

In the year 2006, the transfer of the Israeli Police Department to the West Bank E-1 area was approved by the USA under the pretense of the safety of Israel. The new Israeli Police Department building has been completed but is not in use yet.

Map 7. Map of the Settlement Plan E-1



ROADS

Roads and road networks are crucial for every urban complex. They are the backbone of urban areas. They facilitate the movement of people and goods and enhance development. They provide levels of accessibility between the city's areas. A road network can also be a curse if not planned well, or if planned to prohibit and harden the residents' accessibility within and outside the city.

The mountainous terrain of the Jerusalem region does not allow much flexibility for the construction of a road network. Instead, it forces the planners and designers to use the most economical routes that already exist and have been used by the local residents for many years.

In the last few years, Israel has intensified its efforts to build a network of bypass roads and loop highways in Jerusalem. Theoretically, the road network has been planned, developed, and constructed in the Jerusalem area in order to decrease the traffic volume flowing from the city center and around the core (See **Map 8**). In principle, such a plan may appear positive at first glance. However, upon inspection, one realizes that the vast road network is actually dedicated to:

- Connecting the Israeli neighborhoods and settlements within the municipal boundaries of the city to satellite villages and towns.
- Linking all of them to the greater inter-regional road network.
- Creating a non-peripheral West Jerusalem, by connecting it to other urban Israeli settlement and towns in the eastern, southern, and northern adjacent areas.

This same road network also has other implications for the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem. It abets:

- The consumption and expropriation of the Palestinian land through arbitrary, disruptive and confiscatory processes to build roads to which Palestinians have only limited access.
- The segregation and fragmentation of East Jerusalem into isolated neighborhoods, hindering mobility between the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, and between East Jerusalem and the surrounding villages, towns and cities.
- The limitation of any future Palestinian development by the existence of these roads as a barrier restricting expansion and development.

Roads and road networks in and around East Jerusalem are divided into three types: Israeli regional roads, Israeli linking roads, and Palestinian neighborhood connectors. The sections below present the main routes of these types of roads, and their influence on the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem.

Regional Roads

Regional roads connect cities to their environs, and sometimes to other cities. In Jerusalem, the regional roads perform both functions: they connect West Jerusalem to Israeli settlements and to other cities. In general, they are not dedicated to the Palestinian population.

The following roads are the major roads connecting West Jerusalem and the Israeli settlements and cities with each other:

- Road No. 60 connects the north-eastern settlements of the Jerusalem area with the south-western settlements. It extends from the Israeli settlements of Pisgat Ze'ev settlement (in East Jerusalem), passing through the center of West Jerusalem, and reaching the Etzion settlement bloc near Bethlehem. This road extends further to south Hebron, and thus

connects the Etzion settlement bloc with the Qiryat Arba settlement near Hebron.

This road has been historically used to connect Ramallah and Hebron, passing through Jerusalem. However, after the Second Intifada in 2000, this function has been totally cancelled. Moreover, since the closure of 1993, Palestinians have been forced to use other rough, badly designed minor roads, in which traveling requires triple the time needed on Road No. 60. An example of these roads is the so-called Wadi An Nar (the Valley of Hell) road connecting the north of the West Bank to its south through Al Eizariya.

- Road No. 443 (and its extension Road No. 404) connects Tel Aviv and Modi'in with Giv'at Ze'ev through Bet Horon. It extends further connecting Giv'at Ze'ev with Ramot and Jerusalem through the municipal Road No. 436, which joins Road No. 60 in the south. The entire route exists within the occupied West Bank and is connected to the municipal Road No. 4 (linking to the West Jerusalem center and south of Jerusalem), and then to the municipal Road No. 1 that leads to the Jordan Valley and Road No. 90. It is important to mention that Palestinian residents of villages in the northwest of Jerusalem (Beit Hanina Al Balad, Bir Nabala, Al Jib, Beit Surik, Beit 'Anan and Biddu) are denied access to Road No. 443.

In addition, since the beginning of the Second Intifada in September 2000, the Israeli forces have closed all the roads inside these villages that lead to Road No. 45 (which is connected to Road No. 443), because the residents of these villages do not hold East Jerusalem Israeli IDs. Hence, their natural link with East Jerusalem and the suburbs in the north and the east has been severed.

- Road No. 1 is an Israeli regional road that connects Tel Aviv to the eastern parts of the West Bank, especially the settlement of Ma'aleh Adumim. It passes through Jerusalem dividing it into two parts: north and south. In the municipal boundaries, this road includes the so called Mount Scopus Tunnel Road that links the Ma'aleh Adumim settlement with Tel Aviv. This road has changed the travel behavior of Palestinians from using the Eizariya-Jericho historic main road, which is totally blocked now with the wall in the Abu Dis area, to using No. 1 instead. As a result, the function of the Palestinian villages of Al Eizariya and Abu Dis was dramatically changed, and they are now left isolated from the Palestinian urban fabric.

On another level, building Road No. 1 was also associated with the confiscation of lands from the Palestinian neighborhoods of Wadi Al Joz and At Tur (the Mount of Olives). Palestinian building and development is prohibited 150 meters on the side of each of the roads in



Mount Scopus Tunnel Road. 2007.

these neighborhoods.

Municipal Linking Roads

Municipal linking roads are major streets within the city that connect vital areas or neighborhoods together. In Jerusalem, the function of these roads is to isolate the Palestinian, and connect the Israeli neighborhoods and settlements of East Jerusalem. In addition, these roads fragment and divide the Palestinian built-up areas and expropriate huge areas of land from Palestinian residents for the benefit and use of Israeli settlers.

The main linking roads are:

- The so called “East and West Ring Roads” and the Rekevet road bypass East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem centers, connecting directly to the regional roads (mainly Road No. 60 and Road No.1) that connect to Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The planned East Ring Road which will connect settlements in the south part of the city with the eastern and north-eastern settlements will pass parallel to Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, expropriating huge Palestinian areas. This will involve the confiscation of 658 dunums (164 acres), which are part of the small Palestinian reserve for development. Moreover, it will lead to the demolition of no fewer than forty Palestinian homes. Although Palestinian residents technically are allowed use this road, there is no access to the road due to

the absence of junctions that connect the Palestinian neighborhoods to it. There is very limited Palestinian use of it.

The planned West Ring Road will connect Israeli settlements to the south of the Jerusalem area (in the West Bank) with the Etzion settlement bloc (via Road No. 39). Together with the East Ring road, it forms a complete ring road around the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem. This ring bypasses the Palestinian neighborhoods in the Jerusalem area and, simultaneously, connects Israeli neighborhoods and settlements.

- The municipal Road No. 4 and No. 404 connect the south of Jerusalem to the Israeli settlements in the north and to 'Atarot industrial settlement and the Jerusalem Airport. It is also used by Palestinian residents to travel from Qalandiya Checkpoint to Jerusalem. Jerusalemites prefer to use this road instead of the partially blocked Jerusalem-Ramallah main road, which passes through the congested Beit Hanina and Shu'fat neighborhoods. Accordingly, the travel behavior of the Palestinian residents has changed due to the construction of the road. This behavior, which is historically based on using the Ramallah-Jerusalem road, was moved to Road No. 404. This step has caused further fragmentation of Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, and has changed their historical function of serving as a connection to other adjacent Palestinian villages and cities.



Municipal Road No. 1. 2007

- Municipal Road No. 1 connects West Jerusalem with the Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem (French Hill, Pisgat Ze'ev, and Neve Ya'akov). It totally separates the Palestinian built-up areas (Beit Hanina and Shu'fat) and the Israeli settlement, Pisgat Ze'ev but is built entirely upon Palestinian land. At the same time, the construction of this road guarantees Israeli policy makers that the Palestinian neighborhoods of Beit Hanina and Shu'fat cannot expand any more to the east (that is east to municipal road No 1).

Neighborhood Connectors

This type of road connects Palestinian neighborhoods with each other and with nearby villages. Their infrastructure is in very bad condition and many have not been repaired for decades. They represent a sharp contrast with the modern road network in Israeli settlements. Since the beginning of the Second Intifada (September 2000), the function of these roads as connectors has dramatically changed. For example:

- Roads connecting Palestinian neighborhoods

within Jerusalem boundaries were blocked due to "security measures." Thus blockage of roads in Beit Hanina, Ar Ram, and Ras Al Amud has caused the isolation of these neighborhoods and their disconnection from other adjacent Palestinian built-up areas.

- Roads that connect East Jerusalem neighborhoods with the Palestinian villages and cities around them were damaged and not repaired. Examples include the Jerusalem-Ramallah main road, the section after Qalandiya Checkpoint, and the main road to Shu'fat Refugee Camp. As a result, Palestinian villages surrounding Jerusalem have been totally isolated, and the movement of vehicles to and from these areas has become very difficult.

- The North Begin Road splits many Palestinian villages and creates new enclaves within divided villages, where unity has been broken and interaction between the parts has been made very cumbersome if not impossible. This may be observed in Beit Hanina Al Balad and Qalandiya villages where Bedouin tribes have been isolated without any access to their surrounding areas.



Palestinian neighborhood connector in Beit Hanina. 2007.

• Accessibility to some roads was weakened as a result of new planning regulations and designs. For instance, the exit from Wadi Al Joz neighborhood is associated with congestion in peak hours due to the opening of the Tunnel Road that leads to Ma'aleh Adumim. Moreover, the Beit Hanina main road decreased in width as a result of building the light railway on one of the two lanes. Furthermore, one year ago, in the Central Business District near the Old City of Jerusalem, access of private vehicles to Nablus Road and to one lane in Sultan Suleiman Road has been prohibited due to new public transportation regulations that "aim at preferring and encouraging public transportation," according to reports of the Israeli Transportation Ministry and the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem. However, the situation on the ground is different; the

whole area suffers from congestion, disorder and irregular public transportation.

To sum up, the interaction of the road network could be portrayed as an "Israeli-serving" network, which at the same time, limits the development and accessibility for Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem. The Railway Road (Kveesh Harekevet), the Mount Scopus Road and tunnels, and the North Begin Road are examples of this. The roads have been constructed within and around the Jerusalem Municipality and serve the Israeli settlements within and outside the municipal boundaries, connecting them to the center of the city (see **Table 21**). At the same time, these wide roads intercept and fragment Palestinian neighborhoods and built-up areas and confiscate many of the Palestinian-owned lands.

Table 21: The Relationship between Road Routes and Communities


Road	Road Type	Direction	Palestinian Communities Separated by the Road	Israeli settlements Connected by the Road	Main Connections
Road No. 60	Main Municipal and Inter-regional	North- South	.Beit Safafa .Sharafat .Qalandiya	. Gush Etzion Bloc . Betar Illit . Har Gilo . Gilo . Pisgat Ze'ev . Rekhes Shu'fat . Atarot Industrial Zone	Gush Etzion, settlements in East Jerusalem, settlements to North East Jerusalem.
Road No. 443 Instead of 45	Inter-regional	West-East	.Qalandiya .Rafaat	. Modi'in Bloc . Beit Horon . Giv'at Binyamin . Sha'ar Binyamin . Industrial Zone . Giv'at Ze'ev Bloc . Kfar Adumim . Atarot Industrial Zone	King Abdullah Bridge Road No. 443 and then Road No. 6 near Modi'in Road No. 60
Regional Road No. 1	Inter-regional National	West-East	. Wadi Al Joz . At Tur . Az Za'ayyem . Abu Dis . Al Eizariya	. French Hill . Ma'aleh Adumim Bloc	Tel Aviv and Ma'aleh Adumim
Mount Scopus Road (tunnels) - Part of municipal Road No.1	Main Municipal	West-East	. At Tur (Mount of Olives) . Az Za'ayyem . Wadi Al Joz	. Mount Scopus . French Hill . Ramat Eshkol . Ma'aleh Adumim	Center of Jerusalem and Ma'aleh Adumim Bloc

Municipal Road No. 9	Main Municipal and Inter-regional	West East	. Sheikh Jarrah . Shu'fat	. French Hill . Ramot . Rekhes Shu'fat	Tel Aviv Highway No. 1 and Road No. 1 to Jericho
Kveesh Harekevet (South Ring Road)	Main Municipal and Inter-regional	West-East	. Beit Safafa . Jabal Al Mukabbir . Sur Bahir	. Har Homa . East Talpiyot . Ma'aleh Adumim Bloc	East and West Ring Roads and Road No. 39
East Ring Road (under construction)	Main Municipal and Inter-regional	North-East with South-East	. Um Tuba . Sur Bahir . Jabal Al Mukabbir . As Sawahira . Al Gharbiya . Ash Sheikh Sa'd . Abu Dis . Ras Al Amud . Ash Shayyah . At Tur . Az Za'ayyem . Al Isawiyya	. Har Homa . East Talpiyot . Ma'aleh Adumim Bloc . Nahal Anatot . Almon . Pisgat Omer . Pisgat Ze'ev . Neve Ya'akov	Settlement in East Jerusalem with Road No. 60 that connects to settlement in north and south the West Bank
West Ring Road (under construction)	Main Municipal and Inter-regional	North-West with South-West	. Al Walaja	. Gush Etzion Bloc . Har Gilo . Betar Illit	Gush Etzion bloc with Tel Aviv (in the west), Ma'aleh Adumim Bloc (in the east), and Ramot
Road No. 4, Road No. 404, and Begin Road	Main Municipal and Inter-regional National	North- South	. Beit Safafa . Sharafat . Beit Hanina Al Balad . Bir Nabala	. Gilo . Ramot . Rekhes Shu'fat . Atarot Industrial Zone	Gilo and Atarot Gush Etzion and Tel Aviv
Municipal Road No. 1	Main Municipal	North-South	. Sheikh Jarrah . Shu'fat . Beit Hanina	. Ramat Eshkol . French Hill . Pisgat Omer . Pisgat Ze'ev . Neve Ya'akov	Center and North settlements in East Jerusalem

Moreover, no kind of construction is allowed on either side of the roads (and around most of the regional roads) for a minimum of 100 to 150 meters. This creates a buffer zone seam line composed of the width of the four lane road, plus over 200 meters of perimeter area.

Additionally, for Israeli travelers' safety, each side of the thoroughfare of these roads has been defined by a two and a half meter high wall with a head bend atop, sometimes decorated by barbed or razor wire, in order to stop Palestinian local residents from crossing the roads.

Map 8. Roads in the Jerusalem Area



Checkpoints



Hizma Checkpoint. 2007.

In 1993, after the Madrid Peace conference, and on the eve of the Oslo agreement, Israel implemented a policy of closure by imposing a general closure of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (WBG). This policy was enforced by installing numerous manned checkpoints which isolate Palestinians in neighborhoods within East Jerusalem from their WBG brethren. The checkpoints have severely impaired the right of freedom of movement and association and other related basic human rights. It has disrupted movement between the south and the north of the West Bank through the main route which had passed through Jerusalem. WBG Palestinians have been denied access to Jerusalem and Israel unless they have special permits. There are no specific or clear procedures or criteria for obtaining the permits. Many Palestinians have been denied permits and have had to return from checkpoints. In the past, they

were still able to use alternative indirect routes to enter the city "illegally."

In 1996, Israel decided to establish further restrictions on the freedom of movement. Manned permanent checkpoints were erected at municipal border points, preventing access of people and goods to the city. Additional checkpoints and road blocks which blocked the streets and made it even harder to cross, were added. Meanwhile, Israel's permit policy was gradually becoming stricter, and the procedure of issuing a permit was becoming more humiliating and fruitless. Israel could choose to cancel a permit-use whenever it declares "total closure."

In year 2000, further closures took place within the streets of East Jerusalem and its suburbs, which had been used by people to enter "illegally." These road blocks stopped vehicles

and people from crossing from one point to the other. It has since become almost impossible for people not carrying Jerusalem blue ID cards to enter the city. Palestinians who enter the city “illegally” are subject to fines, arrest and imprisonment.

These actions have severely affected the economy of East Jerusalem, which was very dependant on West Bank areas and the surrounding satellite villages. The closure only affected Palestinian areas, restricting Palestinians’ access to education, trade and health services in East Jerusalem. It led to poverty and reinforced their economic dependency on Israel. Checkpoints have been a preparatory stage for the unilateral separation that is now enforced by the wall encircling the city and isolating it from all its surroundings. Points, where checkpoints and barriers were placed are now often points where the wall has been built.

Military checkpoints in and around East

Jerusalem can be classified into two main types: permanent checkpoints, and non-permanent checkpoints.

Permanent Checkpoints

These are checkpoints existing permanently on the main entrance roads to the city, along the boundaries of Municipal Jerusalem. They isolate Jerusalem’s hinterland and separate the city from the surrounding Palestinian communities. Around such checkpoints, one can see goods transferred manually, or by carts and mules and sometimes from the back of one vehicle to the back of another. This latter transfer occurs when one vehicle that is permitted to travel freely without restrictions in Israel offloads to another that is restricted to the West Bank side, or vice versa. **Table 22** lists the thirteen permanent checkpoints that are currently within Jerusalem. Some of these checkpoints have become “border crossings” which are illustrated below.

Table 22. Permanent Israeli Occupation Checkpoints in and around Jerusalem (see Map 9)

No	Location	Checkpoint/ Controlled By	Relationship to Jerusalem Municipal Boundary	Separates Jerusalem Palestinian Neighborhoods and Suburbs	Separates West Bank Areas From Jerusalem
1	North	Qalandiya* Airport/ Israeli Army , Port Authority	Within	. Kafr Aqab . Qalandiya . Rafaat . Um Ash Sharayet . Samiramis	. Ramallah / Al Bireh . All regions of northern West Bank
2	North	Dahiyat Al Bareed/ Border Police	Within	. Al Jib . Jaba’ . Bir Nabala . Al Judeira . Beit Hanina . Dahiyat Al Bareed . Ar Ram . All the north western villages of Jerusalem Governorate	. Ramallah . All regions of northern West Bank
3	North West	Atarot Road 404 / Border Police, Israeli Army	Outside	. Qalandiya . Rafaat . Bir Nabala . Al Judeira . Dahiyat Al Bareed . Ar Ram . All the north western villages of the Jerusalem governorate.	. Ramallah / Al Bireh . All regions of northern West Bank

4	North West	An Nabi Samwil Ramot/ Israeli Army & Border Police	On the Boundary	. Beit Ikka . An Nabi Samwil . Beit Hanina Al Balad . Biddu . Qatanna . Al Qubeibeh . Beit Surik . Beit Ikka . Beit Ijza . Al Jib . Bir Nabala . Beit Duqqu . Beit Anan	. All regions of northern West Bank
5	North East	Hizma/ Israeli Army	On the Boundary	. Hizma . Mikhmas . Jaba' . Bedouin Tribes	. Entire West Bank
6	North East	Shu'fat Refugee Camp/Border Police	Within	. Anata . Dahiyat As Salam . Shu'fat Refugee Camp . Ras Khamis . Ras Shehadeh	. Entire West Bank
7	East	Az Za'ayyem/ border police	On the Boundary	. Az Za'ayyem . Bedouin Tribes	. Jericho . North & South of West Bank
8	South East	Wadi An Nar/ Israeli Army	Outside	. As Sawahira	. Entire West Bank
9	South	Bethlehem*/ Israeli Army	Within	. Al Walaja . Cremisan . JIun El Hummus . Bir Ona	. Bethlehem . Hebron . All regions of southern West Bank
10	South	Beit Jala Tunnel Road/ Border Police	Outside	. Al Walaja . Cremisan . Bir Ona	. Bethlehem . Beit Jala . Hebron . All regions of southern West Bank
11	South West	Al Walaja/ Israeli Army	Outside	. Bir Ona . Cremisan . Al Walaja	. Bethlehem . Beit Jala . Hebron . All regions of southern West Bank
12	North East	Jaba'/ Israeli Army	Outside	. Ar Ram	. Ramallah
13	South East	Jabal Az Zaitoon*/ Israeli Army, Port Authority	On the Boundary	. Al Eizariya . Abu Dis . As Sawahira Ash Sharqiya . Ash Sheikh Sa'd	. All regions of southern West Bank

*Checkpoints that became "border crossings" through which West Bankers with permits can pass.

It is worth mentioning that Palestinians from the West Bank are not allowed to enter Jerusalem/Israel using their private cars, even if they have permits. They have to use public transport. In addition to this, they are not allowed to cross all Israeli permanent checkpoints. Using their permits, they are only allowed to cross the

checkpoints that separate two West Bank areas, and the three “Border Crossings/Terminals” into Jerusalem; Qalandiya (Atarot), Bethlehem, and Jabal Az Zaitoon. Palestinian Jerusalemites are not allowed to pass all permanent checkpoints as well, especially the ones separating two West Bank areas.

Table 23. Categorizing of Daily Commuters to and from Jerusalem according to Checkpoint, 2007
(Checkpoint numbers are according to **Table 22**)

Commuters	Checkpoints												
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Palestinian Jerusalem Public Transport	A	N/A	A	N/A	N/A	A	A	N/A	N/A	A	N/R	N/R	N/A
Jerusalem private cars	A	N/A*	A	A	A	A	A	N/A	N/A***	A	N/R	A	N/A
Jerusalem Pedestrians	A	N/A*	N/R	N/R	N/R	A	N/R	N/A	N/A***	N/R	N/R	N/R	A
West Bank Public Transport / private cars	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	A**	N/A	N/A	N/A	A	N/A
West Banker (pedestrians) with permit	A	N/A	N/R	N/R	N/A	N/A**	A	A**	A	N/A	N/A	N/R	A
Israeli Settlers	N/R	N/R	A	A	A	N/R	A	N/R	N/R****	A	A	N/R	N/R
*	Except Palestinians who live or work in Beit Hanina, and diplomats.												
**	Except West Bankers who have a special checkpoint-pass permit.												
***	Except Jerusalemites that carry a proof of living inside Jerusalem beyond the wall.												
****	Israelis going to Rachel’s tomb have a separate way so that they won’t have to cross the checkpoint.												
A	Allowed to pass												
N/A	Not allowed to pass												
N/R	Not Relevant (do not pass this area)												

Non-permanent Checkpoints

The Israeli Forces have many additional frequent checkpoints in the core of the Old City and inner belt of Jerusalem, in and around Palestinian neighborhoods separating them from West Jerusalem and affecting their normal daily life by representing an obstacle to the movement of the Palestinians, and

at Jerusalem’s entrances and gates outside the municipal boundary and in the suburbs. These checkpoints are manned by the police or the army, and form a part of the Israeli control grip on entry into the city. Extra checkpoints are installed during Friday Muslim prayers and Jewish festivals. The following tables list the frequent locations of such checkpoints.

Table 24. Israeli Occupation Force Frequent Checkpoints within the Old City and the Inner Belt

No.	Area	Checkpoint Location/ Separates Areas
1	Old City	Jaffa Road – New Gate
2	Old City	Dung Gate – Jewish Quarter
3	Old City	Jaffa Gate
4	Old City	Lion Gate
5	Bab As Sahira	Herod's Gate – Salah Eddin St.
6	Al Musrara	Al Musrara – Prophets' St.
7	Silwan	Silwan – Dung Gate
8	Ras Al Amud	Gethsemane – Ras Al Amud
9	Sheikh Jarrah	American Colony – Road # 1
10	Wadi Al Joz	Old City – Wadi Al Joz
11	Wadi Al Joz	Industrial zone – Mt. Scopus
12	At Tur	Old City – Mt. of Olives
13	At Tur	At Tur – Mt. Scopus
14	Ath Thuri/ Abu Tor	Old City – Ath Thuri

Table 25. Israeli Occupation Force Frequent Checkpoints within the Palestinian Neighborhoods of Jerusalem

No.	Location	Area	Controls & Affects Jerusalem Palestinian Neighborhoods
1	Ath Thuri/Abu Tor	Center	. Silwan . At Thuri . Wadi Qaddum and Basheer . Ras Al Amud
2	Sur Bahir/ Kibbutz Ramat Rachel	South West	. Jabal Al Mukabbir . As Sawahira Al Gharbiya . Um Tuba . Sur Bahir
3	Sur Bahir/ East Talpiyot	South West	. Um Tuba . Sur Bahir . As Sawahira Al Gharbiya
4	Um Tuba/ Har Homa	South West	. Um Tuba . Sur Bahir
5	Jabal Al Mukabbir / UN HQ Government House	South west	. Jabal Al Mukabbir . As Sawahira Al Gharbiya . Ash Sheikh Sa'd . Silwan . Ras Al Amud

6	Beit Safafa/ Talpiyot Industrial Zone	South	. Beit Safafa . Sharafat
7	Beit Hanina/ Neve Ya'akov	North	. Beit Hanina
8	Beit Hanina/ Dahiyat Al Bareed	North	. Beit Hanina
9	Beit Hanina/ Pisgat Ze'ev Road No.1	North	. Beit Hanina
10	Shu'fat French Hill junction	North	. Northern neighborhoods
11	Isawiyya/ French Hill	North East	. Az Za'ayyem . Isawiyya . Anata
12	Isawiyya/ Mount Scopus	North East	. Isawiyya . At Tur . Az Za'ayyem
13	Jabal Al Mukabbir/ East Talpiyot	South East	. Jabal Al Mukabbir . As Sawahira Al Gharbiya . Ash Sheikh Sa'd . Sur Bahir . Um Tuba
14	Um Tuba/ Har Homma	South East	. Um Tuba . Sur Bahir
15	Beit Safafa/ Giv'at Hamatos	South	. Beit Safafa
16	Beit Safafa/ Tantur /Gilo	South	. Beit Safafa . Tabaliya . Sharafat . Bir Ona . Al Walaja . Southern region

Table 26. Israeli Occupation Force Frequent Checkpoints Outside the Municipal Boundary of Jerusalem and its Suburbs

No	Location	Separates
1	North	Beit Hanina – Atarot
2	South East	Eizariya – Ma'aleh Adumim
3	North	Bir Nabala – Ramallah
4	North West	Beit Ikksa – Ramot
5	North West	Beit Ikksa – Beit Hanina Al Balad
6	North East	Anata – Hizma

These checkpoints are abundant at any time or place and seemingly do not require justification. They separate Palestinian

neighborhoods from Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem, as well as separating Palestinian neighborhoods from each other.

In addition, dozens of temporary checkpoints are erected during the Jewish, Christian and Muslim holidays, especially around the Old City. The narrow streets within the Old City itself do not escape the brutality of the checkpoints during these festivals. For example, on the Christian Holy Saturday all the streets around the Holy Sepulcher are closed to worshipers and residents of the houses in the area, who must face difficulties in gaining entry to their own homes. Similarly, the number of checkpoints typically increases on Fridays and on Sundays, the holy days of Muslim and Christian worship. During

the Jewish festivals, when the whole of the Jerusalem center is closed, and traffic to the vicinity of the Old City is totally disrupted, "No-entry" to the surrounding areas may even be enforced.

In summary, the checkpoints, as listed in **Tables 22, 24, 25, and 26** collectively create a clear cut separation of Jerusalem from its natural environs of the Palestinian hinterland and are satellite towns. As a result, the economic, social and living conditions of Jerusalem itself are deteriorating and turning the city into a city under siege.

Road Blockades

Checkpoints, that have seriously impacted Palestinian daily life, have been accompanied by various kinds of road blockades which disrupt the road network and form additional obstacles to the freedom of movement.

Road blockades may appear in one form or in a combination of obstacles, such as:

- Digging up the asphalt and the road bed, creating ditches up to several meters deep.
- Building huge earthen and rubbish mounds across the roads and junctions which are often more than three meters high.
- Placing huge boulders across a road and across road intersections.
- Placing massive concrete cubic meter blocks in a line across the road or in a zigzag pattern that inhibits movement.

The obstacle blockades are normally unmanned. Typically, the traveler must exit a vehicle, scale a first barricade, hike to a second barricade perhaps 100 meters or more distant, scale it, and acquire passage in a second vehicle. Obviously this complicates travel since a different auto, ambulance, truck, taxi, or bus must be found upon crossing over and then again upon return. Imagine the elderly working their way over the barricades, or a mother with small children, or any disabled person.


Clearly, the blockades obstruct normal life, disrupting the flow of people and goods and interrupting humanitarian and basic services to the neighborhoods. They create Palestinian Bantustans and additional sub-seam lines within the larger seam line of Jerusalem. The fear prevails that these neighborhoods, which were respected small villages, will in the near future become slum ghettos that have no basic humanitarian services, including ambulances, police, and utility maintenance. (see **Map 9**)

The practice of destroying the road network system in order to produce road blockades around Palestinian Jerusalem neighborhoods is a mechanism by which the Israeli authorities redirect the traffic of vehicles and pedestrians onto only a one road access/outlet to the

neighborhoods. The Israeli security forces are always present at the outlet. For example, the neighborhood of Nuseibeh in Beit Hanina has all its functional access roads blocked from the main Ramallah/ Jerusalem Route No. 60. One back road to the neighborhood is left open. Automobile traffic must access the neighborhood via the longer route along a narrow back road that was not planned for the large volume of redirected traffic. Pedestrians may access the neighborhood using the back road, but most take a short cut from Route No. 60, over a rough path that includes earthen and massive rock hurdles. However, even the short cut involves a trek of one kilometer. It is a grueling walk home for those carrying shopping and escorting or carrying their small children.

Another example is the case of Ash Sheik Sa'd which is an area in the Jabal Al Mukabbir neighborhood in Jerusalem. It is surrounded by steep hills heading towards the east. The neighborhood has only one southeastern access for both pedestrians and vehicle traffic. On 20 September 2002, the Israeli authorities blocked this single entrance with a barricade inside the Jerusalem Municipal boundary. This left the residential area, which belonged to the municipality, outside the blockade, excluding it from municipal services yet requiring the residents to pay municipal fees. Ash Sheik Sa'd has a population of 2,800 Palestinians forming three Hamulas (families); 1,500 residents carry Israeli East Jerusalem blue ID cards and the others have West Bank ID cards, which means that the latter are under the jurisdiction of the PNA. The center of life of the blue carders is Jerusalem and the Old City. They can transit the blockades, but the Israeli security forces prohibit the West Bankers from crossing, and if they are caught violating this imposed rule, they are arrested, charged, fined and imprisoned. Likewise, it is now forbidden for a blue card Jerusalemite to transport a relative who has a West Bank ID. If caught attempting this, the car papers are confiscated for a period of time and the driver is heavily fined, charged and sent to court as a criminal. Some face jail for several months.

Map 9: The Jerusalem Area Checkpoints, Blockades and Barriers



The Wall of Fragmentation



The Wall in Qalandiya. 2007.

Segments of the Fragmentation Wall in and around Jerusalem (see **Map 10**)

While approval of the first phase of the wall primarily concerned the northwestern West Bank barrier, it also included approval of construction of what Israeli spokespersons have come to call “the Jerusalem Envelope.” The plans initially included a 22-kilometer wall around East Jerusalem comprised of two segments: the first, north of the city in the area extending from the Ofer military base (southwest of Ramallah) to the Qalandiya Checkpoint; the second, south of the city in the area extending from Ras Beit Jala to Deir Salah Village southeast of Jerusalem. Construction of the two segments was completed in July 2003, thereby isolating Palestinian East Jerusalem from Ramallah in the north and from Bethlehem in the south. The segments also exclude from the city the Samiramis and Kafr Aqab neighborhoods which actually lie within the municipal northern borders of

East Jerusalem. The population of the two excluded neighborhoods is approximately twelve thousand.

In September 2003 the Israeli security cabinet approved all the segments of the wall in and around Jerusalem. The segments were approved as part of phases three and four of the overall wall/barrier plan for the entire West Bank, and they include a segment from Deir Salah Village southeast of municipal East Jerusalem, running toward the north to Abu Dis and then eastwards toward Al Eizariya. The length of this component is 17 kilometers. This segment isolated from the city the villages of As Sawahira ash Sharqiya, Arab Al Jahalin, and the suburbs Al Eizariya and Abu Dis. The total area of this enclaved area is 14,550 dunums (3,637 acres) with a population of more than 45,000. The official population is 38,531 but this figure excludes approximately 7,000 Jerusalemites living there who hold an Israeli residency ID card.



The wall in Abu Dis. 2007.

The fourth segment of 14 kilometers extends from the south of Anata Village toward the northwest and excludes from East Jerusalem the Shu'fat Refugee Camp, and the Ras Khamis and Dahiyat As Salam neighborhoods, all of which are actually located within the municipal borders of the city. This stretch continues northbound and toward the northwest and separates the Jerusalem Palestinian suburb of Ar Ram from East Jerusalem before ending at the Qalandiya Checkpoint. This fourth segment will isolate the refugee camp and eastern neighborhoods of approximately twenty-two thousand Palestinians from East Jerusalem; and it will also separate the nine thousand residents of Anata Village from the city. The total area of this enclave is 5,800 dunums (1450 acres). Moreover, the villages of Hizma (population approximately 6,500) and Az Za'ayem (2,500) will be completely isolated from their surroundings. The same fate will befall the residents of Ar Ram and Dahiyat Al Bareed, with a combined population of 50,000. The official number is 27,452 and does not take into account Jerusalemites with Israeli ID who make up one fourth of the population in the Ar Ram area.

Nor does it include the many West Bankers from Hebron and Nablus who have moved to Ar Ram in the past ten years. These latter communities will be enclaved by a wall that extends along the east, south and northern perimeters, converting these suburbs into an isolated island. Previously they were a vital commercial and service center serving East Jerusalem and supporting its relationship with the West Bank. The total area of the enclave is approximately 3,500 dunums (875 acres).

A fifth segment (18 kilometers) of the scheme for isolating East Jerusalem consists in consolidating the city's suburban villages of Bir Nabala, Al Judeira, Al Jib and Beit Hanina Al Balad into an isolated enclaved area linked not to East Jerusalem but to Ramallah by a tunnel. The total population of these villages is approximately 28,000 residents, about half of whom carry West Bank identity cards and the remaining half are holders of East Jerusalem identity cards. The Bir Nabala area grew during the period from 1985-2001 to become an important commercial and industrial axis linked to East Jerusalem. This area began losing its importance at the beginning of

the Second Intifada (September 2000) when Israel sealed its western entrance leading to the Atarot industrial zone and constructed an alternative road for the use of Israelis (Road No. 45). The total area of this enclave is 10,500 dunums (2,630 acres).

Moreover, the wall around the Biddu area in the northwest part of the Jerusalem Governorate will also include five villages that are within the Ramallah Governorate. This segment will run approximately 56 kilometers. This enclave's area is 54,000 dunums (13,500 acres) and it includes 14 Palestinian localities: Beit Sira, Kharbatha Al Misbah, At Tira, Beit Liqia, Beit Nuba, Beit Duqqu, Beit Anan, Al Qubeiba, Kharayeb Um Al Lahim, Biddu, Qatanna, Beit Surik, Beit Iksa and Beit Ijza. This area is surrounded by a barrier from all directions and by Road No. 443 which will isolate the enclave and its 49,681 Palestinian residents from Ramallah in the north.

Another enclave is Al Walaja Village, southwest of Jerusalem. It will be transformed into an isolated area. Part of this village is located within the borders of East Jerusalem; the total area of this enclave is 2,300 dunums (575 acres), with a population of 1,818.

The Effect of the Wall on East Jerusalem

The wall has demographic, social and economic ramifications that will seriously impact East Jerusalem and its hinterland. The urban space of the city will also be severely affected. In reality, for the Palestinians, Jerusalem is no longer the center of the West Bank; it has become an isolated peripheral city and its neighborhoods have been fragmented by a physical barrier and internally divided along national/ethnic, economic and social group lines. The wall is a unilaterally imposed spatial regime which will:

1. Disrupt East Jerusalem's role as the hub linking the north and south West Bank, transforming the city from a service,

commercial, social, and religious center of the West Bank and Gaza into an isolated enclave cut off from the entire Palestinian territories.

2. Create more "facts on the ground"; in this instance, it will change the municipal boundaries of the city by excluding Palestinian neighborhoods and by annexing to West Jerusalem lands of Israeli settlements east, northwest, northeast and southwest of the city. In all, the wall will annex an area of more than 164 square kilometers to Jewish metropolitan Jerusalem. It will strengthen the Israeli continuity at the expense of East Jerusalem's integrity.

3. Change the demographic balance of the population by excluding Palestinian demographic concentrations: 55,000 Palestinian East Jerusalem residents effectively will be removed from the city. More than 130,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem suburbs and villages within the Jerusalem Governorate will be directly affected.

4. Separate East Jerusalem from its hinterland, restricting its natural development and its relationship to the surrounding satellite cities and villages. Bethlehem is the clearest example of a city cut from its «mother city», and it has suffered badly. Bethlehem relied on East Jerusalem services, and its economy was totally dependent on East Jerusalem.

5. Cause real harm to the economy and the role of the secondary commercial and industrial centers in the Jerusalem suburbs (such as Al Eizariya, Bir Nabala and Ar Ram), by isolating them from their center city.

6. Divide families on both sides of the wall. This will obviously impact seriously the social life and the family ties between Palestinians who live on different sides of the wall and also those who live in one of the East Jerusalem's internal enclaves such as the Shu'fat Refugee Camp.

7. Cause severe deterioration in East Jerusalem economy by isolating it from its

supporting surroundings and by denying access and limiting the mobility of people and goods. The wall clearly affects trade and the ability of the city to create an image or conditions that will attract tourists or investors. Ultimately the failed economy will exhaust the residential population and lead to an eventual emigration that will constitute a soft ethnic cleansing.


8. Cause security threats to the Palestinians in residential areas close to the barriers.

9. Reduce the possibility of the birth of a viable and capable Palestinian state enjoying geopolitical contiguity and with East Jerusalem as its capital.



The wall separates families and neighbors only a few meters apart. The houses on the left are within the Jerusalem municipal boundary west of the wall, and the ones on the right are west of Eizariya, on the West Bank side. November 2006.

Map 11: De facto Annexed Greater Jerusalem in Coordination with the Wall Trajectory and Settlement Blocs



BIBLIOGRAPHY

Al-Audat, Hussein, ed. *The Encyclopedia of Palestinian Cities*. Damascus: Department of Culture, PLO, 1990. (in Arabic.)

Arab Hotel Association (AHA), "Palestinian Tourism," *Report in Jerusalem*. October 2003.

Brooks, R. (ed), *The Wall of Annexation and Expansion: Its impact on the Jerusalem Area*, Jerusalem: International Peace and Cooperation Center, 2005. (in English.)

Brooks, R. (ed), *The Wall: Fragmenting Palestinian Fabric in Jerusalem*, Jerusalem: International Peace and Cooperation Center, 2007. (in English.)

Coshen, Maya, *Jerusalem: Facts and Trends 2002-03*, Jerusalem: Ahva Press Ltd., 2003. (in Hebrew.)

Coshen, Maya, Michal Korach, *Jerusalem: Facts and Trends 2004*, Jerusalem: Ahva Press Ltd., 2005. (in Hebrew.)

Jerusalem statistical yearbook No.6. Ramallah: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004. (in Arabic.)

Khamaisi, Rassem, *Conflict Over Housing: The Housing Sector in Jerusalem*. Jerusalem: International Peace and Cooperation Center, 2006. (in Arabic.)

Khamaisi, Rassem, Rami Nasrallah, *The Jerusalem Urban Fabric: Demography, Infrastructure, and Institutions*, Jerusalem: International Peace and Cooperation Center, 2003. (in Arabic.)

Khamaisi, Rassem, Rami Nasrallah and Michael Younan, *Jerusalem on the Map*, Jerusalem: International Peace and Cooperation Center, 2003. (in English.)

Khamaisi, Rassem, Rami Nasrallah and Michael Younan, *Jerusalem on the Map II*, Jerusalem: International Peace and Cooperation Center, 2005. (in English.)

Marom, Nathan, *The Planning Deadlock: Planning Policies, Land Regulations, Building Permits and House Demolitions in East Jerusalem*, Jerusalem: Hed Press Ltd, 2004. (in Hebrew.)

Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem No. 20, 2002-2003, Jerusalem: Ahva Press Ltd., 2004. (in English.)

Tsimhoni, Daphne, *Christian Communities in Jerusalem and the West Bank since 1948: A Historical, Social and Political Study*, Praeger, Westport, Conn. 1993 (in English.)

Electronic Bibliography

<http://www.arij.org>
<http://www.btselem.org>
<http://www.cbs.gov.il>
<http://www.fmep.org>
<http://www.gush-shalom.org>
<http://www.ir-amim.org.il>
<http://www.jjiis.org.il>
<http://www.nad-plo.org>
<http://www.palestinecenter.org>
<http://www.passia.org>
<http://www.pcbs.org>
<http://www.peacenow.org.il>
<http://www.pengon.org>
<http://www.reliefweb.int>
<http://www.stophthewall.org>

Unpublished Documents

"A Statistical Briefing on the Social, Economic and Geographic conditions in the Palestinian territories by the end of 2004." Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (in Arabic.)

"Chosen indicators to General Education in Jerusalem by neighborhood for the school year 2003/ 2004." Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (in Arabic.)

"Press Release on the Findings of Household Social Survey of Jerusalem, 2005." Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.

The Jerusalem area today, especially Palestinian East Jerusalem and its suburbs, are in a state of flux so tumultuous as to approach social chaos. The area is fragmented by checkpoints, border crossings, roadblocks, barricades, and dead-end and “Israelis Only” roads. Entire Palestinian neighborhoods have been separated from their urban core and from other Palestinian communities by a concrete serpentine wall. Jerusalem on the Map III is the most current, comprehensive, and detailed description and analysis available of the situation on the ground in the Holy City today.

Ethnic population trends are traced from 1526 to today, ending with Israel’s most recent efforts to effect a permanent Jewish super-majority. Restrictive land-use policies are examined to establish the near-impossibility of addressing a swelling need for housing and the wretched effects of an oppressive population density. The key effects of the separation wall—which take the form of a land grab, an Israeli demographic surge, and the disintegration of the Palestinian community—are documented and are illustrated with eleven new expert maps of the area. These and additional issues covered in this IPCC study ultimately speak to the two over-arching Jerusalem questions: What will be the final status of Jerusalem? Will the remains of a shattered East Jerusalem be sufficient to form a viable capital for a future Palestinian state?

The International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC) is a Palestinian research, training, and planning organization based in Jerusalem. Founded in 1998, IPCC’s activities have focused on Jerusalem issues; many IPCC projects seek to establish data and information bases that bear on the complex problems that will inevitably impinge on future negotiations on the final status of Jerusalem; these projects frequently result in publications that are distributed to a broad array of local, national, and international decision-makers within governmental and NGO organizations. IPCC also conducts training projects designed to raise the information, competency, and involvement levels of various civil society groupings, including journalists, urban architects and planners, youth, labor, and women. IPCC is a nonprofit organization whose efforts are supported by various international foundations. IPCC frequently partners with European and American universities and Middle East institutions in its projects.

965-7283-12-4



9789657283127

